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arXiv:1106.3756 · Applied Physics Letters

Comment on “Resilience of gated avalanche photodiodes against bright illumination attacks in quantum cryptography” [Appl. Phys. Lett. 98, 231104 (2011)]

Lars Lydersen, Vadim Makarov, Johannes Skaar

Published Nov 7, 2011• 39 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This is a comment on the publication by Yuan et al. [Appl. Phys. Lett. 98, 231104 (2011); arXiv:1106.2675v1 [quant-ph]].
DOI
10.1063/1.3658806

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Semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are commonly used for single photon detection in quantum key distribution. Recently, many attacks using bright illumination have been proposed to manipulate gated InGaAs APDs. In order to devise effective countermeasures, careful analysis of these attacks must be carried out to distinguish between incorrect operation and genuine loopholes. Here, we show that correctly operated, gated APDs are immune to continuous-wave illumination attacks, while monitoring the photocurrent for anomalously high values is a straightforward countermeasure against attacks using temporally tailored light.