Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1102.0885

Cryptographic Protocols under Quantum Attacks

Carolin Lunemann

Published Feb 4, 2011• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

The realm of this thesis is cryptographic protocol theory in the quantum world. We study the security of quantum and classical protocols against adversaries that are assumed to exploit quantum effects to their advantage. Security in the quantum world means that quantum computation does not jeopardize the assumption, underlying the protocol construction. But moreover, we encounter additional setbacks in the security proofs, which are mostly due to the fact that some well-known classical proof techniques are forbidden by certain properties of a quantum environment. Interestingly, we can exploit some of the very same properties to the benefit of quantum cryptography. Thus, this work lies right at the heart of the conflict between highly potential effects but likewise rather demanding conditions in the quantum world.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1102.0885

Related papers

Security Models and Cryptographic Protocols in a Quantum World

Céline Chevalier, Paul Hermouet, Quoc-Huy Vu

The emergence of quantum computing has provided new paradigms for cryptography. On the one hand, it poses significant new threats to existing classically cryptographic systems, requiring the community to define new security models that capture what a quantum adversary can do. On the other hand, it gives us new tools to design cryptographic protocols, with weaker assumptions than in the classical world, or even protocols that are impossible classically. In this survey, we first give an overview of new security definitions for classical cryptography, considering quantum adversaries who can either only use local quantum computation (post-quantum security), or even send quantum messages and in particular have access to oracle in superposition (quantum security). We explore these new notions through the examples of commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, encryption, and signatures. Then, we present what is arguably the most famous application of quantum cryptography: quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that take advantage of unique properties of quantum mechanics to provide secure communication unconditionally. We also explore cryptography beyond QKD, focusing on unclonable cryptography: a family of cryptographic functionalities, built with quantum states, and designed to be resistant to counterfeit by leveraging the “no-cloning” theorem. We examine in particular quantum money, but also the recent notions of unclonable encryption and copy-protection, including related variants. By presenting a comprehensive survey of these topics, this paper aims to provide a thorough understanding of the current landscape and future potential of quantum cryptography.

Foundations and Trends® in Theoretical Computer Science•Jan 15, 2025•1 citation

Classical cryptographic protocols in a quantum world

Sean Hallgren, Adam Smith, Fang Song

Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation (SFE), have played a crucial role in the development of modern cryptography. The extensive theory of these protocols, however, deals almost exclusively with classical attackers. If we accept that quantum information processing is the most realistic model of physically feasible computation, then we must ask: What classical protocols remain secure against quantum attackers? Our main contribution is showing the existence of classical two-party protocols for the secure evaluation of any polynomial-time function under reasonable computational assumptions (for example, it suffices that the learning with errors problem be hard for quantum polynomial time). Our result shows that the basic two-party feasibility picture from classical cryptography remains unchanged in a quantum world.

arXiv:1507.01625•International Journal of Quantum Information•Jun 1, 2015•15 citations

Assumptions in Quantum Cryptography

Normand J. Beaudry

Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure, assumptions are made about the protocol and its devices. If these assumptions are not justified in an implementation then an eavesdropper may break the security of the protocol. Therefore, security is crucially dependent on which assumptions are made and how justified the assumptions are in an implementation of the protocol. This thesis is primarily a review that analyzes and clarifies the connection between the security proofs of quantum-cryptography protocols and their experimental implementations. In particular, we focus on quantum key distribution: the task of distributing a secret random key between two parties. We provide a comprehensive introduction to several concepts: quantum mechanics using the density operator formalism, quantum cryptography, and quantum key distribution. We define security for quantum key distribution and outline several mathematical techniques that can either be used to prove security or simplify security proofs. In addition, we analyze the assumptions made in quantum cryptography and how they may or may not be justified in implementations. Along with the review, we propose a framework that decomposes quantum-key-distribution protocols and their assumptions into several classes. Protocol classes can be used to clarify which proof techniques apply to which kinds of protocols. Assumption classes can be used to specify which assumptions are justified in implementations and which could be exploited by an eavesdropper. Two contributions of the author are discussed: the security proofs of two two-way quantum-key-distribution protocols and an intuitive proof of the data-processing inequality.

arXiv:1505.02792•Jan 1, 2014•14 citations

Cryptography in a Quantum World

Stephanie Wehner

Quantum computing had a profound impact on cryptography. Shor's discovery of an efficient quantum algorithm for factoring large integers implies that many existing classical systems based on computational assumptions can be broken, once a quantum computer is built. It is therefore imperative to find other means of implementing secure protocols. This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of both the physical limitations, as well as the possibilities of cryptography in the quantum setting. In particular, we investigate several questions that are crucial to the security of quantum protocols: How can we find good uncertainty relations for a large number of measurement settings? How does the presence of entanglement affect classical protocols? And, what limitations does entanglement impose on implementing quantum protocols? Finally, can we circumvent some of those limitations using realistic assumptions?

arXiv:0806.3483•Jun 20, 2008•24 citations

The design and analysis of quantum cryptographic protocols

Hong Lai

Quantum cryptography including quantum key distribution and quantum secret sharing, a fundamental branch in quantum information processing, is the process whereby two or more parties agree on a key for subsequent cryptographic use. The goal of quantum cryptography is to establish a secure key in an insecure communication environment, leading to the difficulty of the protocols' design and analysis. In this thesis we focus on the design and analysis of secure and efficient protocols of two or more parties in quantum settings.

•Jun 24, 2016•1 citation

Efficient cryptographic protocols preventing man-in-the-middle attacks

Zvi Galil, Jonathan I. Katz

In the analysis of many cryptographie protocole, it is useful to distinguish two classes of attacks: passive attacks in which an adversary eavesdrops on messages sent between honest users and active attacks (i.e, “man-in-the-middle” attacks) in which—in addition to eavesdropping—the adversary inserts, deletes, or arbitrarily modifies messages sent from one user to another. Passive attacks are well characterized (the adversary's choices are inherently limited) and techniques for achieving security against passive attacks are relatively well understood. Indeed, cryptographers have long focused on methods for countering passive eavesdropping attacks, and much work in the 1970's and 1980's has dealt with formalizing notions of security and providing provably-secure solutions for this setting. On the other hand, active attacks are not well characterized and precise modeling has been difficult. Few techniques exist for dealing with active attacks, and designing practical protocols secure against such attacks remains a challenge. This dissertation considers active attacks in a variety of settings and provides new, provably-secure protocols preventing such attacks. Proofs of security are in the standard cryptographie model and rely on well-known cryptographie assumptions. The protocols presented here are efficient and practical, and may find application in real-world systems.

•Jan 1, 2002•31 citations
The realm of this thesis is cryptographic protocol theory in the quantum world. We study the security of quantum and classical protocols against adversaries that are assumed to exploit quantum effects to their advantage. Security in the quantum world means that quantum computation does not jeopardize the assumption, underlying the protocol construction. But moreover, we encounter additional setbacks in the security proofs, which are mostly due to the fact that some well-known classical proof techniques are forbidden by certain properties of a quantum environment. Interestingly, we can exploit some of the very same properties to the benefit of quantum cryptography. Thus, this work lies right at the heart of the conflict between highly potential effects but likewise rather demanding conditions in the quantum world.
The emergence of quantum computing has provided new paradigms for cryptography. On the one hand, it poses significant new threats to existing classically cryptographic systems, requiring the community to define new security models that capture what a quantum adversary can do. On the other hand, it gives us new tools to design cryptographic protocols, with weaker assumptions than in the classical world, or even protocols that are impossible classically. In this survey, we first give an overview of new security definitions for classical cryptography, considering quantum adversaries who can either only use local quantum computation (post-quantum security), or even send quantum messages and in particular have access to oracle in superposition (quantum security). We explore these new notions through the examples of commitments, zero-knowledge proofs, encryption, and signatures. Then, we present what is arguably the most famous application of quantum cryptography: quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols that take advantage of unique properties of quantum mechanics to provide secure communication unconditionally. We also explore cryptography beyond QKD, focusing on unclonable cryptography: a family of cryptographic functionalities, built with quantum states, and designed to be resistant to counterfeit by leveraging the “no-cloning” theorem. We examine in particular quantum money, but also the recent notions of unclonable encryption and copy-protection, including related variants. By presenting a comprehensive survey of these topics, this paper aims to provide a thorough understanding of the current landscape and future potential of quantum cryptography.
Cryptographic protocols, such as protocols for secure function evaluation (SFE), have played a crucial role in the development of modern cryptography. The extensive theory of these protocols, however, deals almost exclusively with classical attackers. If we accept that quantum information processing is the most realistic model of physically feasible computation, then we must ask: What classical protocols remain secure against quantum attackers? Our main contribution is showing the existence of classical two-party protocols for the secure evaluation of any polynomial-time function under reasonable computational assumptions (for example, it suffices that the learning with errors problem be hard for quantum polynomial time). Our result shows that the basic two-party feasibility picture from classical cryptography remains unchanged in a quantum world.
Quantum cryptography uses techniques and ideas from physics and computer science. The combination of these ideas makes the security proofs of quantum cryptography a complicated task. To prove that a quantum-cryptography protocol is secure, assumptions are made about the protocol and its devices. If these assumptions are not justified in an implementation then an eavesdropper may break the security of the protocol. Therefore, security is crucially dependent on which assumptions are made and how justified the assumptions are in an implementation of the protocol. This thesis is primarily a review that analyzes and clarifies the connection between the security proofs of quantum-cryptography protocols and their experimental implementations. In particular, we focus on quantum key distribution: the task of distributing a secret random key between two parties. We provide a comprehensive introduction to several concepts: quantum mechanics using the density operator formalism, quantum cryptography, and quantum key distribution. We define security for quantum key distribution and outline several mathematical techniques that can either be used to prove security or simplify security proofs. In addition, we analyze the assumptions made in quantum cryptography and how they may or may not be justified in implementations. Along with the review, we propose a framework that decomposes quantum-key-distribution protocols and their assumptions into several classes. Protocol classes can be used to clarify which proof techniques apply to which kinds of protocols. Assumption classes can be used to specify which assumptions are justified in implementations and which could be exploited by an eavesdropper. Two contributions of the author are discussed: the security proofs of two two-way quantum-key-distribution protocols and an intuitive proof of the data-processing inequality.
Quantum computing had a profound impact on cryptography. Shor's discovery of an efficient quantum algorithm for factoring large integers implies that many existing classical systems based on computational assumptions can be broken, once a quantum computer is built. It is therefore imperative to find other means of implementing secure protocols. This thesis aims to contribute to the understanding of both the physical limitations, as well as the possibilities of cryptography in the quantum setting. In particular, we investigate several questions that are crucial to the security of quantum protocols: How can we find good uncertainty relations for a large number of measurement settings? How does the presence of entanglement affect classical protocols? And, what limitations does entanglement impose on implementing quantum protocols? Finally, can we circumvent some of those limitations using realistic assumptions?
Quantum cryptography including quantum key distribution and quantum secret sharing, a fundamental branch in quantum information processing, is the process whereby two or more parties agree on a key for subsequent cryptographic use. The goal of quantum cryptography is to establish a secure key in an insecure communication environment, leading to the difficulty of the protocols' design and analysis. In this thesis we focus on the design and analysis of secure and efficient protocols of two or more parties in quantum settings.
In the analysis of many cryptographie protocole, it is useful to distinguish two classes of attacks: passive attacks in which an adversary eavesdrops on messages sent between honest users and active attacks (i.e, “man-in-the-middle” attacks) in which—in addition to eavesdropping—the adversary inserts, deletes, or arbitrarily modifies messages sent from one user to another. Passive attacks are well characterized (the adversary's choices are inherently limited) and techniques for achieving security against passive attacks are relatively well understood. Indeed, cryptographers have long focused on methods for countering passive eavesdropping attacks, and much work in the 1970's and 1980's has dealt with formalizing notions of security and providing provably-secure solutions for this setting. On the other hand, active attacks are not well characterized and precise modeling has been difficult. Few techniques exist for dealing with active attacks, and designing practical protocols secure against such attacks remains a challenge. This dissertation considers active attacks in a variety of settings and provides new, provably-secure protocols preventing such attacks. Proofs of security are in the standard cryptographie model and rely on well-known cryptographie assumptions. The protocols presented here are efficient and practical, and may find application in real-world systems.