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arXiv:1101.1975 · Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics

How to spell out the epistemic conception of quantum states

Simon Friederich

Published Jun 30, 2011• 18 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsb.2011.01.002

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Quantum mechanics notoriously faces the measurement problem, the problem that if read thoroughly, it implies the nonexistence of definite outcomes in measurement procedures. A plausible reaction to this and to related problems is to regard a system's quantum state $|ψ\rangle$ merely as an indication of our lack of knowledge about the system, i.e., to interpret it epistemically. However, there are radically different ways to spell out such an epistemic view of the quantum state. We here investigate recent developments in the branch that introduces hidden variables $λ$ in addition to the quantum state $|ψ\rangle$ and has its roots in Einstein's views. In particular, we confront purported achievements of a concrete model that has been considered to serve as evidence for an epistemic view of the envisioned kind, as well as specific no-go results and their import. It will be argued that while an epistemic account of the particular kind is not straightforwardly ruled out by the no-go results, they demonstrate that the evidential character of the model(s) discussed rests on a rather shaky foundation, and that they make some achievements widely recognized in the literature appear worthy of doubt.

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The main ambition of this work has been to explore the prospects for dissolving the foundational problems of quantum theory by adopting the epistemic conception of quantum states and reflecting on how it should be spelled out in detail. This differs (at least in emphasis, if not more profoundly) from the main ambition of those — ‘realistically minded’ — philosophers whose declared aim is to determine what reality is like if it is as quantum theory says. If the Rule Perspective is correct, quantum theory does not really say anything about reality at all: features of reality are described not by quantum states, but by NQMCs, and while quantum theory helps us ascribe probabilities to the NQMCs, it does not typically make any statements as to which NQMCs are true and which are false. However, even though quantum theory does not in that sense say anything about reality, we can learn a lot about reality by reflecting on what features it must have for quantum theory’s undisputed empirical success to be possible. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Abstract In quantum foundations, there is growing interest in the program of reconstructing the quantum formalism from clear physical principles. These reconstructions are formulated in an operational framework, deriving the formalism from information-theoretic principles. It has been recognized that this project is in tension with standard ψ-ontic interpretations. This paper presupposes that the quantum reconstruction program (QRP) (i) is a worthwhile project and (ii) puts pressure on ψ-ontic interpretations. Where does this leave us? Prima facie, it seems that ψ-epistemic interpretations perfectly fit the spirit of information-based reconstructions. However, ψ-epistemic interpretations, understood as saying that the wave functions represents one’s knowledge about a physical system, recently have been challenged on technical and conceptual grounds. More importantly, for some researchers working on reconstructions, the lesson of successful reconstructions is that the wave function does not represent objective facts about the world. Since knowledge is a factive concept, this speaks against epistemic interpretations. In this paper, I discuss whether ψ-doxastic interpretations constitute a reasonable alternative. My thesis is that if we want to engage QRP with ψ-doxastic interpretations, then we should aim at a reconstruction that is spelled out in non-factive experiential terms.

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SOME CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN QUANTUM THEORY

IMPERIAL COLLEGE PRESS eBooks•Sep 1, 1995•0 citations
ψψψ-Epistemic Models, Einsteinian Intuitions, and No-Gos. A Critical Study of Recent Developments on the Quantum State
Quantum mechanics notoriously faces the measurement problem, the problem that if read thoroughly, it implies the nonexistence of definite outcomes in measurement procedures. A plausible reaction to this and to related problems is to regard a system's quantum state ∣ψ⟩|ψ\rangle∣ψ⟩ merely as an indication of our lack of knowledge about the system, i.e., to interpret it epistemically. However, there are radically different ways to spell out such an epistemic view of the quantum state. We here investigate recent developments in the branch that introduces hidden variables λλλ in addition to the quantum state ∣ψ⟩|ψ\rangle∣ψ⟩ and has its roots in Einstein's views. In particular, we confront purported achievements of a concrete model that has been considered to serve as evidence for an epistemic view of the envisioned kind, as well as specific no-go results and their import. It will be argued that while an epistemic account of the particular kind is not straightforwardly ruled out by the no-go results, they demonstrate that the evidential character of the model(s) discussed rests on a rather shaky foundation, and that they make some achievements widely recognized in the literature appear worthy of doubt.
The main ambition of this work has been to explore the prospects for dissolving the foundational problems of quantum theory by adopting the epistemic conception of quantum states and reflecting on how it should be spelled out in detail. This differs (at least in emphasis, if not more profoundly) from the main ambition of those — ‘realistically minded’ — philosophers whose declared aim is to determine what reality is like if it is as quantum theory says. If the Rule Perspective is correct, quantum theory does not really say anything about reality at all: features of reality are described not by quantum states, but by NQMCs, and while quantum theory helps us ascribe probabilities to the NQMCs, it does not typically make any statements as to which NQMCs are true and which are false. However, even though quantum theory does not in that sense say anything about reality, we can learn a lot about reality by reflecting on what features it must have for quantum theory’s undisputed empirical success to be possible. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Abstract In quantum foundations, there is growing interest in the program of reconstructing the quantum formalism from clear physical principles. These reconstructions are formulated in an operational framework, deriving the formalism from information-theoretic principles. It has been recognized that this project is in tension with standard ψ-ontic interpretations. This paper presupposes that the quantum reconstruction program (QRP) (i) is a worthwhile project and (ii) puts pressure on ψ-ontic interpretations. Where does this leave us? Prima facie, it seems that ψ-epistemic interpretations perfectly fit the spirit of information-based reconstructions. However, ψ-epistemic interpretations, understood as saying that the wave functions represents one’s knowledge about a physical system, recently have been challenged on technical and conceptual grounds. More importantly, for some researchers working on reconstructions, the lesson of successful reconstructions is that the wave function does not represent objective facts about the world. Since knowledge is a factive concept, this speaks against epistemic interpretations. In this paper, I discuss whether ψ-doxastic interpretations constitute a reasonable alternative. My thesis is that if we want to engage QRP with ψ-doxastic interpretations, then we should aim at a reconstruction that is spelled out in non-factive experiential terms.