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arXiv:1012.5141 · Conference on Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science

Quantum strategic game theory

Shengyu Zhang

Published Jan 8, 2012• 66 citations
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Abstract

We propose a simple yet rich model to extend strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we define quantum Nash and correlated equilibria and study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike all previous work that focused on qualitative questions on specific games of very small sizes, we quantitatively address the following fundamental question for general games of growing sizes:

DOI
10.1145/2090236.2090241

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We propose a simple yet rich model to extend strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we define quantum Nash and correlated equilibria and study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike all previous work that focused on qualitative questions on specific games of very small sizes, we quantitatively address the following fundamental question for general games of growing sizes:
Quantum game theory lays a foundation for understanding the interaction of people using quantum computers with conflicting interests. Recently Zhang proposed a simple yet rich model to study quantum strategic games, and addressed some quantitative questions for general games of growing sizes \cite{Zha10}. However, one fundamental question that the paper did not consider is the characterization of quantum correlated equilibria (QCE). In this paper, we answer this question by giving a sufficient and necessary condition for an arbitrary state ρρρ being a QCE. In addition, when the condition fails to hold for some player iii, we give an explicit POVM for that player to achieve a strictly positive gain. Finally, we give some upper bounds for the maximum gain by playing quantum strategies over classical ones, and the bounds are tight for some games.
This paper is concerned with complexity theoretic aspects of a general formulation of quantum game theory that models strategic interactions among rational agents that process and exchange quantum information. In particular, we prove that the computational problem of finding an approximate Nash equilibrium in a broad class of quantum games is, like the analogous problem for classical games, included in (and therefore complete for) the complexity class PPAD. Our main technical contribution, which facilitates this inclusion, is an extension of prior methods in computational game theory to strategy spaces that are characterized by semidefinite programs.
Quantum game theory aims to study interactions of people (or other agents) using quantum devices with possibly conflicting interests. Recently Zhang studied some quantitative questions in general quantum strategic games of growing sizes~\cite{Zha12}. However, a fundamental question not addressed there is the characterization of quantum correlated equilibria (QCE). In this paper, we answer this question by giving a sufficient and necessary condition for an arbitrary state ρ\rhoρ being a QCE. In addition, when the condition fails to hold for some player iii, we give an explicit positive-operator valued measurement (POVM) for that player to achieve a strictly positive gain of payoff. Finally, we give some upper bounds for the maximum gain by playing quantum strategies over classical ones, and the bounds are tight for some games.
We give a concise and self-contained introduction to the theory of Quantum Games by reviewing the seminal works of Meyer, Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein, Marinatto-Weber and Landsburg, which initiated the study of this field. By generalizing this body of work, we formulate a protocol to Quantumize\textit{Quantumize}Quantumize any finite classical nnn-player game, and use a novel approach of describing such a Quantum Game in terms of commuting Payoff Operators. We describe what advantages can be gained by players by quantumizing such a game, particularly, what additional Nash Equilibria the players can achieve and the Pareto-Optimality of these additional equilibria.
For any two-by-two game G \mathbf {G} , we define a new two-player game G Q \mathbf {G}^Q . The definition is motivated by a vision of players in game G \mathbf {G} communicating via quantum technology according to the protocol introduced by J. Eisert and M. Wilkins. In the game G Q \mathbf {G}^Q , each player’s (mixed) strategy set consists of the set of all probability distributions on the 3-sphere S 3 \mathbf {S}^3 . Nash equilibria in the game can be difficult to compute. Our main theorems classify all possible mixed-strategy equilibria. First, we show that up to a suitable definition of equivalence, any strategy that arises in equilibrium is supported on at most four points; then we show that those four points must lie in one of a small number of allowable geometric configurations.