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arXiv:1012.4366 · Journal of Modern Optics

Tailored bright illumination attack on distributed-phase-reference protocols

L. Lydersen, Johannes Skaar, V. Makarov

Published Mar 24, 2011• 61 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Detector control attacks on quantum key distribution systems exploit the linear mode of avalanche photodiode in single photon detectors. So far, the protocols under consideration have been the BB84 protocol and its derivatives. Here we present how bright tailored illumination exploiting the linear mode of detectors can be used to eavesdrop on distributed-phase-reference protocols, such as differential-phase-shift and coherent-one-way.

DOI
10.1080/09500340.2011.565889

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Detector control attacks on quantum key distribution systems exploit the linear mode of avalanche photodiode in single photon detectors. So far, the protocols under consideration have been the BB84 protocol and its derivatives. Here we present how bright tailored illumination exploiting the linear mode of detectors can be used to eavesdrop on distributed-phase-reference protocols, such as differential-phase-shift and coherent-one-way.
Single photon detectors (SPDs) based on passively quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than 1 nW. A bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key distribution system containing such detectors is described in this paper. In this regime, all SPDs in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous illumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain detector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies the polarization (or other parameters used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such that the target detector stops receiving light, while the other detector(s) continue to be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon sensitivity and, when Eve modifies the polarization again, produces a single click. Thus, Eve has full control of Bob and can perform a successful intercept–resend attack. To check the feasibility of the attack, three different models of passively quenched detectors have been tested. In the experiment, I have simulated the intensity diagrams the detectors would receive in a real QKD system under attack. Control parameters and side effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be practically possible.
We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (PerkinElmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.
Semiconductor avalanche photodiodes (APDs) are commonly used for single photon detection in quantum key distribution. Recently, many attacks using bright illumination have been proposed to manipulate gated InGaAs APDs. In order to devise effective countermeasures, careful analysis of these attacks must be carried out to distinguish between incorrect operation and genuine loopholes. Here, we show that correctly operated, gated APDs are immune to continuous-wave illumination attacks, while monitoring the photocurrent for anomalously high values is a straightforward countermeasure against attacks using temporally tailored light.
In recent years, the security of avalanche photodiodes as single photon detectors for quantum key distribution has been subjected to much scrutiny. The most prominent example of this surrounds the vulnerability of such devices to blinding under strong illumination. We focus on self-differencing avalanche photodiodes, single photon detectors that have demonstrated count rates exceeding 1 GCounts/s resulting in secure key rates over 1 MBit/s. These detectors use a passive electronic circuit to cancel any periodic signals thereby enhancing detection sensitivity. However this intrinsic feature can be exploited by adversaries to gain control of the devices using illumination of a moderate intensity. Through careful experimental examinations, we define here a set of criteria for these detectors to avoid such attacks.
Quantum-key distribution has been studied as an ultimate method for secure communications, and now it is emerging as a technology that can be deployed in real fiber networks. Here, we present our QKD experiments based on the differential- phase-shift QKD protocol. A DPSQKD system has a simple configuration that is easy to implement with conventional optical communication components, and it is suitable for a high-clock rate system. Moreover, although the DPS-QKD system is implemented with an attenuated laser source, it is inherently secure against strong eavesdropping attacks called photon number-splitting attacks, which pose a serious threat to conventional QKD systems with attenuated laser sources. We also describe three types of single-photon detectors that are suitable for high-speed, long-distance QKD: an up-conversion detector, a superconducting single-photon detector, and a sinusoidally gated InGaAs avalanche photodiode. We present our recordsetting QKD experiments that employed those detectors.