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arXiv:1007.2588 · Physical Review A

Experimental quantum-cryptography scheme based on orthogonal states

Alessio Avella, G. Brida, Ivo Pietro Degiovanni, Marco Genovese, Marco Gramegna, P. Traina

Published Dec 10, 2010• 40 citations
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Abstract

Since, in general, nonorthogonal states cannot be cloned, any eavesdropping attempt in a quantum-communication scheme using nonorthogonal states as carriers of information introduces some errors in the transmission, leading to the possibility of detecting the spy. Usually, orthogonal states are not used in quantum-cryptography schemes since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. Nevertheless, L. Goldberg and L. Vaidman [Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 1239 (1995)] proposed a protocol in which, even if the data exchange is realized using two orthogonal states, any attempt to eavesdrop is detectable by the legal users. In this scheme the orthogonal states are superpositions of two localized wave packets traveling along separate channels. Here we present an experiment realizing this scheme.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.82.062309

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Since, in general, nonorthogonal states cannot be cloned, any eavesdropping attempt in a quantum-communication scheme using nonorthogonal states as carriers of information introduces some errors in the transmission, leading to the possibility of detecting the spy. Usually, orthogonal states are not used in quantum-cryptography schemes since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. Nevertheless, L. Goldberg and L. Vaidman [Phys. Rev. Lett. 75, 1239 (1995)] proposed a protocol in which, even if the data exchange is realized using two orthogonal states, any attempt to eavesdrop is detectable by the legal users. In this scheme the orthogonal states are superpositions of two localized wave packets traveling along separate channels. Here we present an experiment realizing this scheme.
Since, in general, non-orthogonal states cannot be cloned, any eavesdropping attempt in a Quantum Communication scheme using non-orthogonal states as carriers of information introduces some errors in the transmission, leading to the possibility of detecting the spy. Usually, orthogonal states are not used in Quantum Cryptography schemes since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. Nevertheless, L. Goldberg and L. Vaidman [Phys. Rev. Lett. 75 (7), pp. 12391243, 1995] proposed a protocol in which, even if the data exchange is realized using two orthogonal states, any attempt to eavesdrop is detectable by the legal users. In this scheme the orthogonal states are superpositions of two localized wave packets which travel along separate channels, i.e. two different paths inside a balanced Mach-Zehnder interferometer. Here we present an experiment realizing this scheme.
We report on our experimental implementation of QKD with orthogonal states. Since, in general, non-orthogonal states cannot be cloned, any eavesdropping attempt in a Quantum Communication scheme using non-orthogonal states as carriers of information introduces some errors in the transmission, leading to the possibility of detecting the spy. Usually, orthogonal states are not used in Quantum Cryptography schemes since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. Nevertheless, L. Goldberg and L. Vaidman proposed a protocol in which, even if the data exchange is realized using two orthogonal states, any attempt to eavesdrop is detectable by the legal users. In this scheme the orthogonal states are superpositions of two localized wave packets travelling along separate channels. Here we describe in detail the first experimental realization of a quantum cryptography system based on orthogonal states and the measures of the main parameters that quantify the quality of the system. Our results demonstrate the possibility of achieving a QKD transmission based on orthogonal state with a Quantum Bit Error Rate comparable with more common secure QKD systems. Therefore, it provides a significant hint to the discussion on the minimal quantum resources necessary for the implementation of quantum tasks overcoming classical limits.
All existing quantum cryptosystems use nonorthogonal states as the carriers of information. Nonorthogonal states cannot be cloned (duplicated) by an eavesdropper. As a result, any eavesdropping attempt must introduce errors in the transmission, and, therefore, can be detected by the legal users of the communication channel. Orthogonal states are not used in quantum cryptography, since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. We present a cryptographic scheme based on orthogonal states, which also assures the detection of any eavesdropper.
In recent years Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) has emerged as the most paradigmatic example of Quantum technology allowing the realization of intrinsically secure communication links over hundreds of kilometers. Beyond its commercial interest QKD also has high conceptual relevance in the study of quantum information theory and the foundations of quantum mechanics. In particular, the discussion on the minimal resources needed in order to obtain absolutely secure quantum communication is yet to be concluded. Here we present an overview on our last experimental results concerning two novel quantum cryptographic schemes which do not require some of the most widely accepted conditions for realizing QKD. The first is Goldenberg-Vaidman protocol \cite{v}, in which even if only orthogonal states (that in general can be cloned without altering the state) are used, any eavesdropping attempt is detectable. The second is N09 protocol \cite{no} which, being based on the quantum counterfactual effect, does not even require any actual photon transmission in the quantum channel between the parties for the communication.
Quantum cryptography cannot prevent eavesdropping, but any eavesdropping attempt can be detected by the legitimate users of the communication channel. This is because eavesdropping affects the quantum state of the information carriers and results in an abnormal error rate. In this paper, we analyze various eavesdropping techniques, which may be either translucent or opaque to the transmitted photons, and we estimate the error rate above which the key distribution is deemed unsafe and should be abandoned.