Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1006.0338 · Advanced Science Letters

Closed Timelike Curves, Superluminal Signals, and “Free Will” in Universal Quantum Mechanics

Hrvoje Nikolić

Published Oct 1, 2012• 8 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We explore some implications of the hypothesis that quantum mechanics (QM) is universal, i.e., that QM does not merely describe information accessible to observers, but that it also describes the observers themselves. From that point of view, "free will" (FW) - the ability of experimentalists to make free choices of initial conditions - is merely an illusion. As a consequence, by entangling a part of brain (responsible for the illusion of FW) with a distant particle, one may create nonlocal correlations that can be interpreted as superluminal signals. In addition, if FW is an illusion, then QM on a closed timelike curve can be made consistent even without the Deutch nonlinear consistency constraint.

DOI
10.1166/asl.2012.3690

Related papers

Quantum randomness and free will

Chetan S. Mandayam Nayakar, R. Srikanth

Both deterministic and indeterministic physical laws are incompatible with control by genuine (non-illusory) free will. We propose that an indeterministic dynamics can be $weakly$ compatible with free will (FW), whereby the latter acts by altering the probability distribution over allowed outcomes. In the quantum physical world, such a FW can collapse the wave function, introducing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, this deviation would stand in conflict with both special relativity and (a variant of) the Strong Church-Turing thesis, implying that the brain may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice, these deviations would not be directly or easily observable, because they occur in sub-neuronal superpositions in the brain, where they would be shrouded in random measurement errors, noise and statistical fluctuations. Our result elucidates the difference between the FW of human observers and that of observed particles in the Free Will Theorem. This difference is a basic reason for why FW (and, in general, consciousness) cannot be recreated by standard artificial intelligence (AI) technology. We propose various neurobiological experiments to test our proposed theory. We speculate that for observers to be aware of a physical theory such as quantum mechanics, FW is necessary and that the theory must therefore not be universal. We suggest that FW may be regarded as a primitive principle in Nature for explaining quantum indeterminism.

arXiv:1011.4898•Nov 22, 2010•2 citations

Quantum Mechanics and Free Will: Counter-Arguments

Martín López-Corredoira

Since quantum mechanics (QM) was formulated, many voices have claimed this to be the basis of free will in the human beings. Basically, they argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, I defend the opposite thesis, that free will cannot be defended in terms of QM. First, because indeterminism does not imply free will, it is merely a necessary condition but not enough to defend it. Second, because all considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against our scientific knowledge about human beings; in particular, neither neurological nor evolutionary theory can admit dualism. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario, so it is concluded that QM has nothing to say about the mind or free will, and its scientific explanation is more related to biology than to physics. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms.

arXiv:quant-ph/0208104•NeuroQuantology•Sep 1, 2009•5 citations

Libertarian free will and quantum indeterminism

Chetan S. Mandayam Nayakar, S. Omkar, R. Srikanth

The basic question in the long-standing debate about free will (FW) is not whether FW can be demonstrated to exist nor even whether it exists, but instead how to define it scientifically. If FW is not dismissed as an illusion nor identified with a variety of unpredictability, then logical paradoxes arise that make FW elusive to define. We resolve these paradoxes through a model of FW, in which FW is a new causal primitive empowered to override physical causality under guidance. We develop a simple mathematical realization of this model, that when applied to quantum theory, suggests that the exercise of FW corresponds to a nonlinear POVM causing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, these deviations would stand in conflict with known conservation laws and invariance principles, implying that the brain, the presumed seat of FW, may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice it will be difficult to distinguish these deviations from quantum and neural noise, and statistical fluctuations. We indicate possible neurobiological and neurological tests, implications and applications of our proposed model.

arXiv:1202.4440•Feb 20, 2012•0 citations

Would the Existence of CTCs Allow for Nonlocal Signaling?

Lucas Dunlap

A recent paper from Brun et al. has argued that access to a closed timelike curve (CTC) would allow for the possibility of perfectly distinguishing nonorthogonal quantum states. This result can be used to develop a protocol for instantaneous nonlocal signaling. Several commenters have argued that nonlocal signaling must fail in this and in similar cases, often citing consistency with relativity as the justification. I argue that this objection fails to rule out nonlocal signaling in the presence of a CTC. I argue that the reason these authors are motivated to exclude the prediction of nonlocal signaling is because the No Signaling principle is considered to a fundamental part of the formulation of the quantum information approach. I draw out the relationship between nonlocal signaling, quantum information, and relativity, and argue that the principle theory formulation of quantum mechanics, which is at the foundation of the quantum information approach, is in tension with foundational assumptions of Deutsch's D-CTC model, on which this protocol is based.

arXiv:1601.04668•Jan 18, 2016•0 citations

Conditions for Lorentz-invariant superluminal information transfer without signaling

G Grössing, S Fussy, J Mesa Pascasio +1 more

We understand emergent quantum mechanics in the sense that quantum mechanics describes processes of physical emergence relating an assumed sub-quantum physics to macroscopic boundary conditions. The latter can be shown to entail top-down causation, in addition to usual bottom-up scenarios. With this example it is demonstrated that definitions of "realism" in the literature are simply too restrictive. A prevailing manner to define realism in quantum mechanics is in terms of pre-determination independent of the measurement. With our counter-example, which actually is ubiquitous in emergent, or self-organizing, systems, we argue for realism without pre-determination . We refer to earlier results of our group showing how the guiding equation of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation can be derived from a theory with classical ingredients only. Essentially, this corresponds to a "quantum mechanics without wave functions" in ordinary 3-space, albeit with nonlocal correlations. This, then, leads to the central question of how to deal with the nonlocality problem in a relativistic setting. We here show that a basic argument discussing the allegedly paradox time ordering of events in EPR-type two-particle experiments falls short of taking into account the contextuality of the experimental setup. Consequently, we then discuss under which circumstances (i.e. physical premises) superluminal information transfer (but not signaling) may be compatible with a Lorentz-invariant theory. Finally, we argue that the impossibility of superluminal signaling - despite the presence of superluminal information transfer - is not the result of some sort of conspiracy (á la "Nature likes to hide"), but the consequence of the impossibility to exactly reproduce in repeated experimental runs a state's preparation, or of the no-cloning theorem, respectively.

arXiv:1603.02123•Journal of Physics Conference Series•Mar 1, 2016•4 citations

Causality paradoxes and nonparadoxes: Classical superluminal signals and quantum measurements

T. M. Helliwell, D. A. Konkowski

A potential causality paradox in quantum mechanics involving the measurement of a correlated system of two atoms that have moved far apart is constructed along the lines of a classical causality paradox involving the exchange of superluminal signals between distant observers. It is shown that the quantum measurement example does not lead to a paradox, but that the results have implications for the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The thought experiments presented have been used in undergraduate courses in special relativity and quantum mechanics.

American Journal of Physics•Nov 1, 1983•6 citations
We explore some implications of the hypothesis that quantum mechanics (QM) is universal, i.e., that QM does not merely describe information accessible to observers, but that it also describes the observers themselves. From that point of view, "free will" (FW) - the ability of experimentalists to make free choices of initial conditions - is merely an illusion. As a consequence, by entangling a part of brain (responsible for the illusion of FW) with a distant particle, one may create nonlocal correlations that can be interpreted as superluminal signals. In addition, if FW is an illusion, then QM on a closed timelike curve can be made consistent even without the Deutch nonlinear consistency constraint.
Both deterministic and indeterministic physical laws are incompatible with control by genuine (non-illusory) free will. We propose that an indeterministic dynamics can be weaklyweaklyweakly compatible with free will (FW), whereby the latter acts by altering the probability distribution over allowed outcomes. In the quantum physical world, such a FW can collapse the wave function, introducing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, this deviation would stand in conflict with both special relativity and (a variant of) the Strong Church-Turing thesis, implying that the brain may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice, these deviations would not be directly or easily observable, because they occur in sub-neuronal superpositions in the brain, where they would be shrouded in random measurement errors, noise and statistical fluctuations. Our result elucidates the difference between the FW of human observers and that of observed particles in the Free Will Theorem. This difference is a basic reason for why FW (and, in general, consciousness) cannot be recreated by standard artificial intelligence (AI) technology. We propose various neurobiological experiments to test our proposed theory. We speculate that for observers to be aware of a physical theory such as quantum mechanics, FW is necessary and that the theory must therefore not be universal. We suggest that FW may be regarded as a primitive principle in Nature for explaining quantum indeterminism.
Since quantum mechanics (QM) was formulated, many voices have claimed this to be the basis of free will in the human beings. Basically, they argue that free will is possible because there is an ontological indeterminism in the natural laws, and that the mind is responsible for the wave function collapse of matter, which leads to a choice among the different possibilities for the body. However, I defend the opposite thesis, that free will cannot be defended in terms of QM. First, because indeterminism does not imply free will, it is merely a necessary condition but not enough to defend it. Second, because all considerations about an autonomous mind sending orders to the body is against our scientific knowledge about human beings; in particular, neither neurological nor evolutionary theory can admit dualism. The quantum theory of measurement can be interpreted without the intervention of human minds, but other fields of science cannot contemplate the mentalist scenario, so it is concluded that QM has nothing to say about the mind or free will, and its scientific explanation is more related to biology than to physics. A fatalistic or materialist view, which denies the possibility of a free will, makes much more sense in scientific terms.
The basic question in the long-standing debate about free will (FW) is not whether FW can be demonstrated to exist nor even whether it exists, but instead how to define it scientifically. If FW is not dismissed as an illusion nor identified with a variety of unpredictability, then logical paradoxes arise that make FW elusive to define. We resolve these paradoxes through a model of FW, in which FW is a new causal primitive empowered to override physical causality under guidance. We develop a simple mathematical realization of this model, that when applied to quantum theory, suggests that the exercise of FW corresponds to a nonlinear POVM causing deviations from the Born rule. In principle, these deviations would stand in conflict with known conservation laws and invariance principles, implying that the brain, the presumed seat of FW, may be an arena of exotic, non-standard physics. However, in practice it will be difficult to distinguish these deviations from quantum and neural noise, and statistical fluctuations. We indicate possible neurobiological and neurological tests, implications and applications of our proposed model.
A recent paper from Brun et al. has argued that access to a closed timelike curve (CTC) would allow for the possibility of perfectly distinguishing nonorthogonal quantum states. This result can be used to develop a protocol for instantaneous nonlocal signaling. Several commenters have argued that nonlocal signaling must fail in this and in similar cases, often citing consistency with relativity as the justification. I argue that this objection fails to rule out nonlocal signaling in the presence of a CTC. I argue that the reason these authors are motivated to exclude the prediction of nonlocal signaling is because the No Signaling principle is considered to a fundamental part of the formulation of the quantum information approach. I draw out the relationship between nonlocal signaling, quantum information, and relativity, and argue that the principle theory formulation of quantum mechanics, which is at the foundation of the quantum information approach, is in tension with foundational assumptions of Deutsch's D-CTC model, on which this protocol is based.
We understand emergent quantum mechanics in the sense that quantum mechanics describes processes of physical emergence relating an assumed sub-quantum physics to macroscopic boundary conditions. The latter can be shown to entail top-down causation, in addition to usual bottom-up scenarios. With this example it is demonstrated that definitions of "realism" in the literature are simply too restrictive. A prevailing manner to define realism in quantum mechanics is in terms of pre-determination independent of the measurement. With our counter-example, which actually is ubiquitous in emergent, or self-organizing, systems, we argue for realism without pre-determination . We refer to earlier results of our group showing how the guiding equation of the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation can be derived from a theory with classical ingredients only. Essentially, this corresponds to a "quantum mechanics without wave functions" in ordinary 3-space, albeit with nonlocal correlations. This, then, leads to the central question of how to deal with the nonlocality problem in a relativistic setting. We here show that a basic argument discussing the allegedly paradox time ordering of events in EPR-type two-particle experiments falls short of taking into account the contextuality of the experimental setup. Consequently, we then discuss under which circumstances (i.e. physical premises) superluminal information transfer (but not signaling) may be compatible with a Lorentz-invariant theory. Finally, we argue that the impossibility of superluminal signaling - despite the presence of superluminal information transfer - is not the result of some sort of conspiracy (á la "Nature likes to hide"), but the consequence of the impossibility to exactly reproduce in repeated experimental runs a state's preparation, or of the no-cloning theorem, respectively.
A potential causality paradox in quantum mechanics involving the measurement of a correlated system of two atoms that have moved far apart is constructed along the lines of a classical causality paradox involving the exchange of superluminal signals between distant observers. It is shown that the quantum measurement example does not lead to a paradox, but that the results have implications for the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The thought experiments presented have been used in undergraduate courses in special relativity and quantum mechanics.