I will propose that the reality to which the quantum formalism implicitly refers is a kind of generalized history, the word history having here the same meaning as in the phrase sum-over-histories. This proposal confers a certain independence on the concept of event, and it modifies the rules of inference concerning events in order to resolve a contradiction between the idea of reality as a single history and the principle that events of zero measure cannot happen (the Kochen-Specker paradox being a classic expression of this contradiction). The so-called measurement problem is then solved if macroscopic events satisfy classical rules of inference, and this can in principle be decided by a calculation. The resulting conception of reality involves neither multiple worlds nor external observers. It is therefore suitable for quantum gravity in general and causal sets in particular.
I will propose that the reality to which the quantum formalism implicitly refers is a kind of generalized history, the word history having here the same meaning as in the phrase sum-over-histories. This proposal confers a certain independence on the concept of event, and it modifies the rules of inference concerning events in order to resolve a contradiction between the idea of reality as a single history and the principle that events of zero measure cannot happen (the Kochen-Specker paradox being a classic expression of this contradiction). The so-called measurement problem is then solved if macroscopic events satisfy classical rules of inference, and this can in principle be decided by a calculation. The resulting conception of reality involves neither multiple worlds nor external observers. It is therefore suitable for quantum gravity in general and causal sets in particular.
We propose a realistic, spacetime interpretation of quantum theory in which reality constitutes a *single* history obeying a "law of motion" that makes definite, but incomplete, predictions about its behavior. We associate a "quantum measure" |S| to the set S of histories, and point out that |S| fulfills a sum rule generalizing that of classical probability theory. We interpret |S| as a "propensity", making this precise by stating a criterion for |S|=0 to imply "preclusion" (meaning that the true history will not lie in S). The criterion involves triads of correlated events, and in application to electron-electron scattering, for example, it yields definite predictions about the electron trajectories themselves, independently of any measuring devices which might or might not be present. (So we can give an objective account of measurements.) Two unfinished aspects of the interpretation involve *conditonal* preclusion (which apparently requires a notion of coarse-graining for its formulation) and the need to "locate spacetime regions in advance" without the aid of a fixed background metric (which can be achieved in the context of conditional preclusion via a construction which makes sense both in continuum gravity and in the discrete setting of causal set theory).
Precise rules are developed in order to formalize the reasoning processes involved in standard non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with the help of analogies from classical physics. A classical or quantum description of a mechanical system involves a {\it framework}, often chosen implicitly, and a {\it statement} or assertion about the system which is either true or false within the framework with which it is associated. Quantum descriptions are no less ``objective'' than their classical counterparts, but differ from the latter in the following respects: (i) The framework employs a Hilbert space rather than a classical phase space. (ii) The rules for constructing meaningful statements require that the associated projectors commute with each other and, in the case of time-dependent quantum histories, that consistency conditions be satisfied. (iii) There are incompatible frameworks which cannot be combined, either in constructing descriptions or in making logical inferences about them, even though any one of these frameworks may be used separately for describing a particular physical system. A new type of ``generalized history'' is introduced which extends previous proposals by Omnès, and Gell-Mann and Hartle, and a corresponding consistency condition which does not involve density matrices or single out a direction of time. Applications which illustrate the formalism include: measurements of spin, two-slit diffraction, and the emergence of the classical world from a fully quantum description.
Understanding quantum theory has been a subject of debate from its birth. Many different formulations and interpretations have been proposed. Here we examine a recent novel formulation, namely the coevents formulation. It is a histories formulation and has as starting point the Feynman path integral and the decoherence functional. The new ontology turns out to be that of a coarse-grained history. We start with a quantum measure defined on the space of histories, and the existence of zero covers rules out single-history as potential reality (the Kochen Specker theorem casted in histories form is a special case of a zero cover). We see that allowing coarse-grained histories as potential realities avoids the previous paradoxes, maintains deductive non-contextual logic (alas non-Boolean) and gives rise to a unique classical domain. Moreover, we can recover the probabilistic predictions of quantum theory with the use of the Cournot's principle. This formulation, being both a realist formulation and based on histories, is well suited conceptually for the purposes of quantum gravity and cosmology.
A measurement-independent formulation of quantum mechanics called ‘regular histories’ (RH) is presented, able to reproduce the predictions of the standard formalism without the need to for a quantum-classical divide or the presence of an observer. It applies to closed systems and features no wave-function collapse. Weights are assigned only to histories satisfying a criterion called ‘regularity’. As the set of regular histories is not closed under the Boolean operations this requires a new con- cept of weight, called ‘likelihood’. Remarkably, this single change is enough to overcome many of the well-known obstacles to a sensible interpretation of quantum mechanics. For example, Bell’s theorem, which makes essential use of probabilities, places no constraints on the locality properties of a theory based on likelihoods. Indeed, RH is both counter- factually definite and free from action-at-a-distance. Moreover, in RH the meaningful histories are exactly those that can be witnessed at least in principle. Since it is especially difficult to make sense of the concept of probability for histories whose occurrence is intrinsically indeterminable, this makes likelihoods easier to justify than probabilities. Interaction with the environment causes the kinds of histories relevant at the macroscopic scale of human experience to be witnessable and indeed to generate Boolean algebras of witnessable histories, on which likelihoods reduce to ordinary probabilities. Further- more, a formal notion of inference defined on regular histories satisfies, when restricted to such Boolean algebras, the classical axioms of implication, explaining our perception of a largely classical world. Even in the context of general quantum histories the rules of reasoning in RH are remark- ably intuitive. Classical logic must only be amended to reflect the fundamental premise that one cannot meaningfully talk about the occurrence of unwitnessable histories. Crucially, different histories with the same ‘physical content’ can be interpreted in the same way and independently of the family in which they are expressed. RH thereby rectifies a critical flaw of its inspiration, the consistent histories (CH) approach, which requires either an as yet unknown set selection rule or a paradigm shift towards an un- conventional picture of reality whose elements are histories-with-respect-to-a-framework. It can be argued that RH compares favourably with other proposed interpretations of quantum mechanics in that it resolves the measurement problem while retaining an essentially classical worldview without parallel universes, a framework-dependent reality or action-at-a-distance.
Where does what happens happen in a quantum system? The standard textbook formulation of quantum mechanics provides a strange, imprecise and yet successful-in-practice answer to this question. In the struggle to unify our understanding of gravity with quantum theory, though, the textbook answer no longer suffices, and an alternative approach is needed. The Feynman Sum Over Histories approach provides an alternative that is particularly suited to quantum gravity because the Sum Over Histories and General Relativity are built on the same fundamental concepts of `event' and `history'.
Quantum measure theory can be introduced as a histories based reformulation (and generalisation) of Copenhagen quantum mechanics in the image of classical stochastic theories. These classical models lend themselves to a simple interpretation in which a single history (a single element of the sample space) is deemed to be 'real'; we require only that this real history should not be ruled out by the dynamics, the axioms of which ensure that not all histories are precluded. However, applying this interpretation naively to quantum measure theory we can find experimentally realisable systems (notably the Peres-Kochen-Specker system) in which every history is ruled out by the dynamics, challenging us to formulate a deeper realist framework. Our first response is to hold on to our existing interpretative framework and attempt a revision of the dynamics that would reduce quantum measure theory to a classical dynamics. We explore this approach by examining the histories formulation of a stochastic-collapse model on a simple (discrete) null-lattice, concluding that the drawbacks of this approach outweigh the benefits. Our second response is to abandon our classically inspired interpretation in favour of Sorkin's 'co-events', a more general ontology that still allows for strict realism. In this case the 'potentially real' objects of the theory (the 'beables' in Bell's language) are not individual histories but truth valuation maps, or co-events. We develop & evaluate various co-event schemes that have been suggested to date, finally adopting the multiplicative scheme; the current working model of co-event theory and a promising interpretation of quantum measure theory, though still a work in progress. We conclude by exploring the expression of the dynamics & predictions in this new framework.