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arXiv:1002.0087 · Physics Letters A

Noise in the wire: The real impact of wire resistance for the Johnson(-like) noise based secure communicator

László B. Kish, Jacob Scheuer

Published Mar 22, 2010• 58 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1016/j.physleta.2010.03.021

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Binary Classifier Wire-Resistance Attack on KLJN: Impact of Narrowing the Resistor Gap

MEHMET YILDIRIM, László B. Kish

It is shown that narrowing the difference between the high and low resistor values in the Kirchhoff Law–Johnson Noise (KLJN) key exchange strongly affects security against a recently introduced binary classifier-based wire resistance attack. Using time domain simulations of a non-ideal KLJN loop with finite cable resistance, we generate large ensembles of secure (HL/LH) bits and evaluate the mean-square noise voltages at Alice’s and Bob’s ends. For each bit, these mean-square values form a point in a two-dimensional classifier plane, where the separation between the HL and LH point clouds characterizes the information available to an eavesdropper (Eve). We quantify Eve’s success probability p by a simple decision rule based on the sign of the difference between the measured mean-square voltages. For strongly asymmetric resistors (for example [Formula: see text] kOhm and [Formula: see text] kOhm) and realistic wire resistances, the HL and LH clouds are fully separable and Eve’s p approaches 1, which confirms that the classifier attack can practically recover all secure bits. As the low resistor value approaches the high one (for example [Formula: see text] kOhm and [Formula: see text] kOhm) at the same cable resistance, the HL and LH clouds increasingly overlap and the measured p drops close to 0.7, approaching the ideal limit [Formula: see text] as [Formula: see text] approaches [Formula: see text]. A surprising phenomenon is that, in this classifier-based scenario, increasing the wire resistance can decrease the information leak. This counterintuitive effect is strikingly the opposite of the behavior in the classical Bergou–Scheuer–Yariv wire resistance attack, where the mean-square voltages at the two ends of the wire are simply compared.

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Thermal noise informatics: totally secure communication via a wire, zero-power communication, and thermal noise driven computing

Laszlo B. Kish, Robert Mingesz, Zoltán Gingl

Very recently, it has been shown that Gaussian thermal noise and its artificial versions (Johnson-like noises) can be utilized as an information carrier with peculiar properties therefore it may be proper to call this topic Thermal Noise Informatics. Zero Power (Stealth) Communication, Thermal Noise Driven Computing, and Totally Secure Classical Communication are relevant examples. In this paper, while we will briefly describe the first and the second subjects, we shall focus on the third subject, the secure classical communication via wire. This way of secure telecommunication utilizes the properties of Johnson(-like) noise and those of a simple Kirchhoff's loop. The communicator is unconditionally secure at the conceptual (circuit theoretical) level and this property is (so far) unique in communication systems based on classical physics. The communicator is superior to quantum alternatives in all known aspects, except the need of using a wire. In the idealized system, the eavesdropper can extract zero bit of information without getting uncovered. The scheme is naturally protected against the man-in-the-middle attack. The communication can take place also via currently used power lines or phone (wire) lines and it is not only a point-to-point communication like quantum channels but network-ready. We report that a pair of Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson(-like)-Noise communicators, which is able to work over variable ranges, was designed and built. Tests have been carried out on a model-line with ranges beyond the ranges of any known direct quantum communication channel and they indicate unrivalled signal fidelity and security performance. This simple device has single-wire secure key generation/sharing rates of 0.1, 1, 10, and 100 bit/second for copper wires with diameters/ranges of 21 mm / 2000 km, 7 mm / 200 km, 2.3 mm / 20 km, and 0.7 mm / 2 km, respectively and it performs with 0.02% raw-bit error rate (99.98 % fidelity). The raw-bit security of this practical system significantly outperforms raw-bit quantum security. Current injection breaking tests show zero bit eavesdropping ability without setting on the alarm signal, therefore no multiple measurements are needed to build an error statistics to detect the eavesdropping as in quantum communication. Wire resistance based breaking tests of Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv type give an upper limit of eavesdropped raw bit ratio is 0.19 % and this limit is inversely proportional to the sixth power of cable diameter. Hao's breaking method yields zero (below measurement resolution) eavesdropping information.

arXiv:0705.0158•Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE•Jun 7, 2007•7 citations
It is shown that narrowing the difference between the high and low resistor values in the Kirchhoff Law–Johnson Noise (KLJN) key exchange strongly affects security against a recently introduced binary classifier-based wire resistance attack. Using time domain simulations of a non-ideal KLJN loop with finite cable resistance, we generate large ensembles of secure (HL/LH) bits and evaluate the mean-square noise voltages at Alice’s and Bob’s ends. For each bit, these mean-square values form a point in a two-dimensional classifier plane, where the separation between the HL and LH point clouds characterizes the information available to an eavesdropper (Eve). We quantify Eve’s success probability p by a simple decision rule based on the sign of the difference between the measured mean-square voltages. For strongly asymmetric resistors (for example [Formula: see text] kOhm and [Formula: see text] kOhm) and realistic wire resistances, the HL and LH clouds are fully separable and Eve’s p approaches 1, which confirms that the classifier attack can practically recover all secure bits. As the low resistor value approaches the high one (for example [Formula: see text] kOhm and [Formula: see text] kOhm) at the same cable resistance, the HL and LH clouds increasingly overlap and the measured p drops close to 0.7, approaching the ideal limit [Formula: see text] as [Formula: see text] approaches [Formula: see text]. A surprising phenomenon is that, in this classifier-based scenario, increasing the wire resistance can decrease the information leak. This counterintuitive effect is strikingly the opposite of the behavior in the classical Bergou–Scheuer–Yariv wire resistance attack, where the mean-square voltages at the two ends of the wire are simply compared.
Very recently, it has been shown that Gaussian thermal noise and its artificial versions (Johnson-like noises) can be utilized as an information carrier with peculiar properties therefore it may be proper to call this topic Thermal Noise Informatics. Zero Power (Stealth) Communication, Thermal Noise Driven Computing, and Totally Secure Classical Communication are relevant examples. In this paper, while we will briefly describe the first and the second subjects, we shall focus on the third subject, the secure classical communication via wire. This way of secure telecommunication utilizes the properties of Johnson(-like) noise and those of a simple Kirchhoff's loop. The communicator is unconditionally secure at the conceptual (circuit theoretical) level and this property is (so far) unique in communication systems based on classical physics. The communicator is superior to quantum alternatives in all known aspects, except the need of using a wire. In the idealized system, the eavesdropper can extract zero bit of information without getting uncovered. The scheme is naturally protected against the man-in-the-middle attack. The communication can take place also via currently used power lines or phone (wire) lines and it is not only a point-to-point communication like quantum channels but network-ready. We report that a pair of Kirchhoff-Loop-Johnson(-like)-Noise communicators, which is able to work over variable ranges, was designed and built. Tests have been carried out on a model-line with ranges beyond the ranges of any known direct quantum communication channel and they indicate unrivalled signal fidelity and security performance. This simple device has single-wire secure key generation/sharing rates of 0.1, 1, 10, and 100 bit/second for copper wires with diameters/ranges of 21 mm / 2000 km, 7 mm / 200 km, 2.3 mm / 20 km, and 0.7 mm / 2 km, respectively and it performs with 0.02% raw-bit error rate (99.98 % fidelity). The raw-bit security of this practical system significantly outperforms raw-bit quantum security. Current injection breaking tests show zero bit eavesdropping ability without setting on the alarm signal, therefore no multiple measurements are needed to build an error statistics to detect the eavesdropping as in quantum communication. Wire resistance based breaking tests of Bergou-Scheuer-Yariv type give an upper limit of eavesdropped raw bit ratio is 0.19 % and this limit is inversely proportional to the sixth power of cable diameter. Hao's breaking method yields zero (below measurement resolution) eavesdropping information.