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arXiv:0810.5050 · International Journal of Quantum Information

VULNERABILITY OF "A NOVEL PROTOCOL-AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM RULING OUT A MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK IN QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY"

Aysajan Abidin, Jan-Åke Larsson

Published Aug 1, 2009• 14 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this paper, we review and comment on "A novel protocol-authentication algorithm ruling out a man-in-the-middle attack in quantum cryptography" [M. Peev et al., Int. J. Quant. Inf.3 (2005) 225]. In particular, we point out that the proposed primitive is not secure when used in a generic protocol, and needs additional authenticating properties of the surrounding quantum-cryptographic protocol.

DOI
10.1142/s0219749909005754

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In this paper, we review and comment on "A novel protocol-authentication algorithm ruling out a man-in-the-middle attack in quantum cryptography" [M. Peev et al., Int. J. Quant. Inf.3 (2005) 225]. In particular, we point out that the proposed primitive is not secure when used in a generic protocol, and needs additional authenticating properties of the surrounding quantum-cryptographic protocol.
Authentication is an indispensable part of Quantum Cryptography, which is an unconditionally secure key distribution technique based on the laws of nature. Without proper authentication, Quantum Cryptography is vulnerable to “man-in-the-middle” attacks. Therefore, to guarantee unconditional security of any Quantum Cryptographic protocols, the authentication used must also be unconditionally secure. The standard in Quantum Cryptography is to use theWegman-Carter authentication, which is unconditionally secure and is based on the idea of universal hashing. In this thesis, we first investigate properties of a Strongly Universal hash function family to facilitate understanding the properties of (classical) authentication used in Quantum Cryptography. Then, we study vulnerabilities of a recently proposed authentication protocol intended to rule out a "man-in-the-middle" attack on Quantum Cryptography. Here, we point out that the proposed authentication primitive is not secure when used in a generic Quantum Cryptographic protocol. Lastly, we estimate the lifetime of authentication using encrypted tags when the encryption key is partially known. Under simplifying assumptions, we derive that the lifetime is linearly dependent on the length of the authentication key. Experimental results that support the theoretical results are also presented.
Quantum computing presents a significant threat to traditional cryptographic protocols, particularly those relying on the hardness of factoring large integers and computing discrete logarithms, as quantum algorithms can solve these problems in polynomial time. With the advent of quantum computers capable of breaking current cryptographic schemes, the need for quantum-resistant cryptographic mechanisms has become increasingly urgent. In this paper, we focused on authentication, a critical security property, and reviewed various classical cryptographic techniques to this aim and their potential to resist quantum attacks. We present a (non-exhaustive) overview of the state of the art in quantum-resistant authentication, particularly through symmetric cryptography, digital signatures, and hardware-based approaches such as physical unclonable functions (PUF\textsf{PUF}PUFs). By offering a clear and focused analysis, we used this survey to bridge the gap between diverse academic communities and provide a foundation for future research in post-quantum authentication.