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arXiv:0810.2399 · Foundations of Physics

Addendum to: Connecting Spin and Statistics in Quantum Mechanics. DOI 10.1007/s10701-009-9351-4

Arthur Jabs

Published Nov 11, 2009• 14 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/s10701-009-9377-7

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Reviews of quantum foundations

L. E. Ballentine

I enjoyed the February 2019 issue of Physics Today on Reviews of Modern Physics at 90 but was disappointed with the article “Quantum foundations” by David DiVincenzo and Christopher Fuchs (page 50). The most useful part of that article was the reference list, which shows RMP’s diversity of papers on the subject. My 1970 article on the statistical-ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM),11. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358 which people tell me has encouraged them to continue research on quantum foundations (QF), was omitted from the list.Unfortunately, DiVincenzo and Fuchs continue to mystify measurement in QM, as if it were some deep philosophical concept that must be treated before QM has even been fully formulated. They assert that “physicists and philosophers are still debating what a ‘measurement’ really means.” What is important for QF is not the meaning of the word but an understanding of the physical process. The authors do not cite any of the published papers that provide such an understanding. And they give too much attention to two marginal interpretations: the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and quantum Bayesianism (QBism).In QM, a measurement of an observable should yield an eigenvalue of the observable. If the initial state of the measured object is a superposition of eigenstates corresponding to different eigenvalues, then the interaction of the measurement apparatus with the object will lead to a final state of the whole system—measured object plus apparatus—that is a superposition of different measurement results. The squared amplitude of each term yields the probability of obtaining that result in an individual measurement. That statistical prediction, the Born rule, is common to the Copenhagen and statistical-ensemble interpretations. But the MWI takes a radically different turn. It postulates that the universe branches into several parallel worlds, with each term of the superposition corresponding to the unique result of the measurement in one branch world.The usual role of an interpretation of QM is to begin with the established mathematical formalism and provide an intuitively comprehensible idea of the physical process that the math describes. The MWI does not do that. Instead, it adds a mysterious process of world-splitting, a strange new cosmology that is alien to the mathematics of QM and not really an interpretation of QM at all. A typical QM measurement, such as that of a spin component in the Stern–Gerlach experiment, is a local and very low energy event. It is not credible that the measurement could have the huge cosmological effect of bifurcating the universe.When I first heard of the world-splitting assumed in the MWI, I went back to Hugh Everett’s paper22. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454 to see if he had really said anything so absurd. I found that he had not said so explicitly, but he sometimes used words that could be interpreted in more than one way. The MWI is a possible interpretation of them, but not the most natural one, so I thought. And Everett’s framework still has value even without resorting to the MWI’s world-splitting. His concept of a “relative state” is useful, for instance, and he is correct in rejecting the notion of the quantum state “collapsing” after a measurement.QBism begins with the assumption that all kinds of probability can be regarded as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That assumption can be maintained only by ignoring the literature on interpretations of probability, from which it is clear that several different kinds—or interpretations—of probability exist. DiVincenzo and Fuchs may have ignored the classic philosophical writings on the subject because they were written by philosophers for philosophers and so do not address the needs of physicists.I have published a paper on the foundations of probability theory, written from the point of view of a quantum physicist.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 I classify the main kinds or interpretations of probability into three groups: inferential probability, of which Bayesian theory is an example; frequency or ensemble probability, commonly used in Gibbsian statistical mechanics and in QM; and propensity theory. Propensity, a degree of causality that is weaker than determinism, is not merely another interpretation of probability. Its mathematical theory must also differ from that of probability theory, as Paul Humphreys showed44. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246 in 1985. Although the axioms of propensity33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 differ from those of probability, the two axiom sets overlap. Both support the law of large numbers, so propensity theory is compatible with the most useful part of the frequency interpretation of probability.In general, QM states do not determine the results of a measurement, only the probabilities of the possible results. That a state’s influence on the results is not deterministic suggests strongly that the quantum probabilities given by the Born rule should be interpreted as propensities. They refer objectively to the physical system and its environment, not to any agent’s knowledge, so they are not naturally interpreted as subjective Bayesian probabilities.Interpretations of probability may differ not only in philosophy but also in substance. As I discuss in reference 33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, John Bell’s theorem illustrates how local hidden-variable theories are incompatible with QM. E. T. Jaynes was a well-known supporter of the Bayesian theory of probability. In 1989 he repeated Bell’s derivation of inequality but carefully treated all instances of probability as Bayesian. He found that the derivation could not be completed without invoking an extra assumption that was not justifiable in the Bayesian theory. Bell’s theorem involves questions about causality, so it is natural to use propensity theory to treat it. That method is successful in deriving Bell’s inequality.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0Not all probabilities occurring in QM can be treated as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That limitation disqualifies QBism, a Bayesian-based theory, as an interpretation of QM that can succeed in quantum foundations. The initial assumption of QBism is not valid.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358, Google ScholarCrossref2. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454, Google ScholarCrossref3. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, Google ScholarCrossref4. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246, Google ScholarCrossref© 2020 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Jun 1, 2020•2 citations

Readers offer their own magic moments with John Bell

Robert B. Griffiths

Reinhold Bertlmann’s article “Magic moments with John Bell” was a pleasure to read. I add a note concerning some later developments that are significant for understanding the implications of Bell’s quantum foundations work.The crucial point is that under the Bell locality hypothesis for a joint measurement as given in the article,E(a,b)=∫dλρ(λ)A(a,λ)·B(b,λ)the quantity λ that represents the hidden variable(s) is a classical, not a quantum, object, and ρ(λ) is a classical probability distribution. Such expressions only make sense in the context of quantum theory when the operators of interest commute with each other, but that is not the case when this expression is used to derive a Bell inequality.Many years ago Arthur Fine pointed out that hidden variables and Bell inequalities were “imposing requirements to make well defined precisely those probability distributions for noncommuting observables whose rejection is the very essence of quantum mechanics.”11. A. Fine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.48.291 Thus the real issue is not one of locality but, instead, the proper use of probabilities in quantum theory.Fine’s point has been confirmed by the later development of a fully consistent way of introducing probabilities in quantum mechanics.22. R. B. Griffiths, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consistent-histories. That approach has shown that when quantum mechanics is interpreted using subspaces of the Hilbert space rather than classical hidden variables to represent physical properties, it is local: There are no ghostly nonlocal influences.We cannot know how Bell would have responded to those new developments, which only came to full fruition after his untimely death. The reader willing to dig into my somewhat tedious discussion33. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press (2002), sec. 23.4. of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and Bohm situation will find an explicit proof that a measurement by Alice has not the slightest effect on the spin on Bob’s side. More recent is a general argument that quantum mechanics satisfies a principle of Einstein locality: What is done to system A has no effect on system B as long as there is no interaction between the two.44. R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5Those proofs of quantum locality begin by taking very seriously John von Neumann’s proposal that quantum properties correspond to Hilbert subspaces, whose projectors do not, in general, commute with one another.55. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton U. Press (1955), sec. 3.5. Bell, though, assumed that such properties can be represented by classical hidden variables, which always commute. Thus Bell’s theorem teaches that if one uses classical hidden variables in place of quantum properties, the result will contradict quantum theory and disagree with experiment. Indeed, while Bell started off by pointing out deficiencies in von Neumann’s argument against hidden variables, the end result of his work is an even better and much more conclusive argument, backed by experiment, for rejecting classical hidden variables.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. A. Fine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.48.291, Google ScholarCrossref2. R. B. Griffiths, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consistent-histories. Google Scholar3. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press (2002), sec. 23.4. Google Scholar4. R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5, Google ScholarCrossref5. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton U. Press (1955), sec. 3.5. Google Scholar© 2015 American Institute of Physics.

Physics Today•Nov 30, 2015•0 citations
I enjoyed the February 2019 issue of Physics Today on Reviews of Modern Physics at 90 but was disappointed with the article “Quantum foundations” by David DiVincenzo and Christopher Fuchs (page 50). The most useful part of that article was the reference list, which shows RMP’s diversity of papers on the subject. My 1970 article on the statistical-ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM),11. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358 which people tell me has encouraged them to continue research on quantum foundations (QF), was omitted from the list.Unfortunately, DiVincenzo and Fuchs continue to mystify measurement in QM, as if it were some deep philosophical concept that must be treated before QM has even been fully formulated. They assert that “physicists and philosophers are still debating what a ‘measurement’ really means.” What is important for QF is not the meaning of the word but an understanding of the physical process. The authors do not cite any of the published papers that provide such an understanding. And they give too much attention to two marginal interpretations: the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and quantum Bayesianism (QBism).In QM, a measurement of an observable should yield an eigenvalue of the observable. If the initial state of the measured object is a superposition of eigenstates corresponding to different eigenvalues, then the interaction of the measurement apparatus with the object will lead to a final state of the whole system—measured object plus apparatus—that is a superposition of different measurement results. The squared amplitude of each term yields the probability of obtaining that result in an individual measurement. That statistical prediction, the Born rule, is common to the Copenhagen and statistical-ensemble interpretations. But the MWI takes a radically different turn. It postulates that the universe branches into several parallel worlds, with each term of the superposition corresponding to the unique result of the measurement in one branch world.The usual role of an interpretation of QM is to begin with the established mathematical formalism and provide an intuitively comprehensible idea of the physical process that the math describes. The MWI does not do that. Instead, it adds a mysterious process of world-splitting, a strange new cosmology that is alien to the mathematics of QM and not really an interpretation of QM at all. A typical QM measurement, such as that of a spin component in the Stern–Gerlach experiment, is a local and very low energy event. It is not credible that the measurement could have the huge cosmological effect of bifurcating the universe.When I first heard of the world-splitting assumed in the MWI, I went back to Hugh Everett’s paper22. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454 to see if he had really said anything so absurd. I found that he had not said so explicitly, but he sometimes used words that could be interpreted in more than one way. The MWI is a possible interpretation of them, but not the most natural one, so I thought. And Everett’s framework still has value even without resorting to the MWI’s world-splitting. His concept of a “relative state” is useful, for instance, and he is correct in rejecting the notion of the quantum state “collapsing” after a measurement.QBism begins with the assumption that all kinds of probability can be regarded as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That assumption can be maintained only by ignoring the literature on interpretations of probability, from which it is clear that several different kinds—or interpretations—of probability exist. DiVincenzo and Fuchs may have ignored the classic philosophical writings on the subject because they were written by philosophers for philosophers and so do not address the needs of physicists.I have published a paper on the foundations of probability theory, written from the point of view of a quantum physicist.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 I classify the main kinds or interpretations of probability into three groups: inferential probability, of which Bayesian theory is an example; frequency or ensemble probability, commonly used in Gibbsian statistical mechanics and in QM; and propensity theory. Propensity, a degree of causality that is weaker than determinism, is not merely another interpretation of probability. Its mathematical theory must also differ from that of probability theory, as Paul Humphreys showed44. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246 in 1985. Although the axioms of propensity33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0 differ from those of probability, the two axiom sets overlap. Both support the law of large numbers, so propensity theory is compatible with the most useful part of the frequency interpretation of probability.In general, QM states do not determine the results of a measurement, only the probabilities of the possible results. That a state’s influence on the results is not deterministic suggests strongly that the quantum probabilities given by the Born rule should be interpreted as propensities. They refer objectively to the physical system and its environment, not to any agent’s knowledge, so they are not naturally interpreted as subjective Bayesian probabilities.Interpretations of probability may differ not only in philosophy but also in substance. As I discuss in reference 33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, John Bell’s theorem illustrates how local hidden-variable theories are incompatible with QM. E. T. Jaynes was a well-known supporter of the Bayesian theory of probability. In 1989 he repeated Bell’s derivation of inequality but carefully treated all instances of probability as Bayesian. He found that the derivation could not be completed without invoking an extra assumption that was not justifiable in the Bayesian theory. Bell’s theorem involves questions about causality, so it is natural to use propensity theory to treat it. That method is successful in deriving Bell’s inequality.33. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0Not all probabilities occurring in QM can be treated as subjective Bayesian probabilities. That limitation disqualifies QBism, a Bayesian-based theory, as an interpretation of QM that can succeed in quantum foundations. The initial assumption of QBism is not valid.ReferencesSection:ChooseTop of pageReferences <<CITING ARTICLES1. L. E. Ballentine, Rev. Mod. Phys. 42, 358 (1970). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.42.358, Google ScholarCrossref2. H. Everett III, Rev. Mod. Phys. 29, 454 (1957). https://doi.org/10.1103/RevModPhys.29.454, Google ScholarCrossref3. L. E. Ballentine, Found. Phys. 46, 973 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-016-9991-0, Google ScholarCrossref4. P. Humphreys, Philos. Rev. 94, 557 (1985). https://doi.org/10.2307/2185246, Google ScholarCrossref© 2020 American Institute of Physics.
Reinhold Bertlmann’s article “Magic moments with John Bell” was a pleasure to read. I add a note concerning some later developments that are significant for understanding the implications of Bell’s quantum foundations work.The crucial point is that under the Bell locality hypothesis for a joint measurement as given in the article,E(a,b)=∫dλρ(λ)A(a,λ)·B(b,λ)the quantity λ that represents the hidden variable(s) is a classical, not a quantum, object, and ρ(λ) is a classical probability distribution. Such expressions only make sense in the context of quantum theory when the operators of interest commute with each other, but that is not the case when this expression is used to derive a Bell inequality.Many years ago Arthur Fine pointed out that hidden variables and Bell inequalities were “imposing requirements to make well defined precisely those probability distributions for noncommuting observables whose rejection is the very essence of quantum mechanics.”11. A. Fine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.48.291 Thus the real issue is not one of locality but, instead, the proper use of probabilities in quantum theory.Fine’s point has been confirmed by the later development of a fully consistent way of introducing probabilities in quantum mechanics.22. R. B. Griffiths, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consistent-histories. That approach has shown that when quantum mechanics is interpreted using subspaces of the Hilbert space rather than classical hidden variables to represent physical properties, it is local: There are no ghostly nonlocal influences.We cannot know how Bell would have responded to those new developments, which only came to full fruition after his untimely death. The reader willing to dig into my somewhat tedious discussion33. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press (2002), sec. 23.4. of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and Bohm situation will find an explicit proof that a measurement by Alice has not the slightest effect on the spin on Bob’s side. More recent is a general argument that quantum mechanics satisfies a principle of Einstein locality: What is done to system A has no effect on system B as long as there is no interaction between the two.44. R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5Those proofs of quantum locality begin by taking very seriously John von Neumann’s proposal that quantum properties correspond to Hilbert subspaces, whose projectors do not, in general, commute with one another.55. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton U. Press (1955), sec. 3.5. Bell, though, assumed that such properties can be represented by classical hidden variables, which always commute. Thus Bell’s theorem teaches that if one uses classical hidden variables in place of quantum properties, the result will contradict quantum theory and disagree with experiment. Indeed, while Bell started off by pointing out deficiencies in von Neumann’s argument against hidden variables, the end result of his work is an even better and much more conclusive argument, backed by experiment, for rejecting classical hidden variables.REFERENCESSection:ChooseTop of pageREFERENCES <<1. A. Fine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 291 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.48.291, Google ScholarCrossref2. R. B. Griffiths, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014); http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-consistent-histories. Google Scholar3. R. B. Griffiths, Consistent Quantum Theory, Cambridge U. Press (2002), sec. 23.4. Google Scholar4. R. B. Griffiths, Found. Phys. 41, 705 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-010-9512-5, Google ScholarCrossref5. J. von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, Princeton U. Press (1955), sec. 3.5. Google Scholar© 2015 American Institute of Physics.