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arXiv:0808.0722 · Physics Letters B

Insufficiency of the quantum state for deducing observational probabilities

Don Nelson Page

Published Jun 10, 2009• 18 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

It is usually assumed that the quantum state is sufficient for deducing all probabilities for a system. This may be true when there is a single observer, but it is not true in a universe large enough that there are many copies of an observer. Then the probability of an observation cannot be deduced simply from the quantum state (say as the expectation value of the projection operator for the observation, as in traditional quantum theory). One needs additional rules to get the probabilities. What these rules are is not logically deducible from the quantum state, so the quantum state itself is insufficient for deducing observational probabilities. This is the measure problem of cosmology.

DOI
10.1016/j.physletb.2009.05.064

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It is usually assumed that the quantum state is sufficient for deducing all probabilities for a system. This may be true when there is a single observer, but it is not true in a universe large enough that there are many copies of an observer. Then the probability of an observation cannot be deduced simply from the quantum state (say as the expectation value of the projection operator for the observation, as in traditional quantum theory). One needs additional rules to get the probabilities. What these rules are is not logically deducible from the quantum state, so the quantum state itself is insufficient for deducing observational probabilities. This is the measure problem of cosmology.
Probabilities in quantum theory are traditionally given by Born's rule as the expectation values of projection operators. Here it is shown that Born's rule is insufficient in universes so large that they contain identical multiple copies of observers, because one does not have definite projection operators to apply. Possible replacements for Born's rule include using the expectation value of various operators that are not projection operators, or using various options for the average density matrix of a region with an observation. The question of what replacement to use is part of the measure problem in cosmology.
Quantum cosmology is the quantum theory of the entire universe. Although strange at first sight, it is appropriate because (1) our world appears to be fundamentally quantum, (2) the classical description of gravity breaks down at singularities it would give at the beginning of the universe, and (3) our universe has many properties that cannot be explained by a classical description of them. A quantum state of the universe should obey certain constraints, such as the Wheeler-DeWitt equations. One approach to interpreting such a state is {\it Sensible Quantum Mechanics} (SQM), in which nothing is probabilistic, except, in a certain frequency sense, conscious perceptions. Sets of these perceptions can be deterministically realized with measures given by expectation values of positive-operator-valued {\it awareness operators}. These may be defined even when the quantum state itself is not normalizable, though there still seem to be problems of divergences when one has an infinite amount of inflation, producing infinitely large spatial volumes with presumably infinite measures of perceptions. Ratios of the measures for sets of perceptions (if finite) can be interpreted as frequency-type probabilities for many actually existing sets rather than as propensities for potentialities to be actualized, so there is nothing indeterministic in a specific SQM. One can do a Bayesian analysis to test between different specific SQMs. One can also make statistical predictions of what one might perceive within a specific SQM by invoking the {\it Conditional Aesthemic Principle}: among the set of all conscious perceptions, our perceptions are likely to be typical.
A simple proof is given that the probabilities of observations in a large universe are not given directly by Born's rule as the expectation values of projection operators in a global quantum state of the entire universe. An alternative procedure is proposed for constructing an averaged density matrix for a random small region of the universe and then calculating observational probabilities indirectly by Born's rule as conditional probabilities, conditioned upon the existence of an observation.
A quantum state, via the Born Rule, assigns probabilities to the different possible values of observables of a quantum system. It is only in virtue of these probabilities — or, alternatively, expectation values — that quantum mechanics is empirically testable. Since assigning a state to a system means assigning probabilities to the values of observables, it may seem natural to read Peierls’ claim that the state ‘represents our knowledge of the system’ (Peierls [1991], p. 19) as a shorthand for saying that the state represents our knowledge of these probabilities. The latter view is sometimes even straightforwardly identified with the epistemic conception of states, for example by Marchildon, who claims that ‘[i]n the epistemic view [of quantum states], the state vector (or wave function or density matrix) does not represent the objective state of a microscopic system […], but rather our knowledge of the probabilities of outcomes of future measurements’ (Marchildon [2004], p. 1454). However, according to an argument due to Fuchs and endorsed by Timpson, 31 the idea that quantum states represent our knowledge about quantum probabilities should not be regarded as the core claim of the epistemic conception of quantum states, simply because, as they argue, this idea is in fact incompatible with the latter. These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
In the present interpretation terms such as ‘measurement,’ ‘observation,’ ‘find,’ ‘classical,’ and ‘apparatus’ do not appear in the formulation of quantum mechanics. Yet it must of course be true that quantum mechanics can be used to predict features of the results of measurements – in particular their statistics. What is required, then, is an account in quantum mechanical terms of those physical interactions capable of being used to perform measurements of quantum dynamical variables, from which it follows that the predicted probabilities for specified behavior of certain quantum systems in these interactions coincide with what, on a more conventional interpretation, are simply postulated as the quantum mechanical probabilities for various measurement results on a system with a given quantum state. It is necessary to see how this consequence may be derived, not only in order to explicate the Born rules, but also to explain the role of quantum states within the present interpretation. The first step toward the required account is to analyze the nature of an interaction capable of being used to perform a measurement of the value of a quantum dynamical variable in a quantum system. Any such interaction will be called an M-type interaction, whether or not it is in fact used to perform a measurement.
Quantum mechanics has several deficiencies as a complete theoretical description of the measurement process. Among them is the fact that the quantum mechanical description of correlations between the single measurements of a sequence is quite problematic. A single measurement is defined to be a preparation followed by an observation. In particular, one feels that an infinite sequence of such single measurements which corresponds to the measurement of a question O on a state η where η does not lie entirely in an eigenspace of O should generate a random output sequence. However, quantum mechanics seems to say nothing about this. In this paper, physical theories are defined in such a manner that correlations between single measurements are explicitly included. In particular, a physical theory is considered to be a mapping U, with domain in the set [Qsτ] of infinite instruction strings for carrying out infinite sequences of single measurements and range in the set of probability measures defined on A, the usual σ algebra of subsets of Ω. Ω is the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. A fundamental property which any valid physical theory must satisfy is that it agrees with experiment. It is proposed and discussed here that much of the intuitive meaning of agreement between a theory U and experiment with respect to H is given by the statement ∀Qsτ [U(Qsτ) defined⇒E(H,U(Qsτ),ψQsτ)],where U(Qsτ) is the probability measure U associates with the infinite instruction string Qsτ and ψQsτ is the outcome sequence obtained by carrying out Qsτ. E(H, U(Qsτ),ψQsτ) is the statement that all formulas in H with one free sequence variable which are true on Ω almost everywhere with respect to U(Qsτ) are true for ψQsτ. H is a subclass of the class of all formulas in a formal language L. A theorem is proved which states that, if U(Qsτ) corresponds to a nontrivial product probability measure and U H-agrees with experiment, then the outcome sequence ψQsτ is H-random. H-randomness is defined here in terms of the statement E(H, P, φ). Another property of a valid physical theory, which is defined here, is that, for some Qsτ, U(Qsτ) must be determinable on much of AH from ψQsτ. Sufficient conditions for this property to hold are given. AH is the class of all H definable subsets of Ω. Some properties of the statement E(H, P, φ) are given. Among other things, it is proved that, if E(H, P, φ) holds and P is a nontrivial probability measure on A, then φ is not definable in H.