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arXiv:0805.0130 · Proceedings of SPIE, the International Society for Optical Engineering/Proceedings of SPIE

On statements of experimental results expressed in the mathematical language of quantum theory

John M. Myers, F. Hadi Madjid

Published Apr 3, 2008• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

We note the separation of a quantum description of an experiment into a statement of results (as probabilities) and an explanation of these results (in terms of linear operators). The inverse problem of choosing an explanation to fit given results is analyzed, leading to the conclusion that any quantum description comes as an element of a family of related descriptions, entailing multiple statements of results and multiple explanations. Facing this multiplicity opens avenues for exploration and consequences that are only beginning to be explored. Among the consequences are these: (1) statements of results impose topologies on control parameters, without resort to any quantum explanation; (2) an endless source of distinct explanations forces an open cycle of exploration and description bringing more and more control parameters into play, and (3) ambiguity of description is essential to the concept of invariance in physics.

DOI
10.1117/12.778500

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We note the separation of a quantum description of an experiment into a statement of results (as probabilities) and an explanation of these results (in terms of linear operators). The inverse problem of choosing an explanation to fit given results is analyzed, leading to the conclusion that any quantum description comes as an element of a family of related descriptions, entailing multiple statements of results and multiple explanations. Facing this multiplicity opens avenues for exploration and consequences that are only beginning to be explored. Among the consequences are these: (1) statements of results impose topologies on control parameters, without resort to any quantum explanation; (2) an endless source of distinct explanations forces an open cycle of exploration and description bringing more and more control parameters into play, and (3) ambiguity of description is essential to the concept of invariance in physics.
This paper contributes to a burgeoning area of investigation, the ambiguity inherent in mathematics and the implications for physics of this ambiguity. To display the mathematical form of equations of quantum theory used to describe experiments, we make explicit the knobs by which the devices of an experiment are arranged and adjusted. A quantum description comes in two parts: (1) a statement of results of an experiment, expressed by probabilities of detections as functions of knob settings, and (2) an explanation of how we think these results come about, expressed by linear operators, also as functions of knob settings. Because quantum mechanics separates the two parts of any description, it is known that between the statements of results and the explanations lurks a logical gap: given any statement of results one has a choice of explanations. Here we work out some consequences of this openness to choice. We show how quantum theory as mathematical language in which to describe experiments necessarily involves multiple descriptions: multiple explanations of a given result, as well as multiple statements of results and multiple arrangement of knobs. Appreciating these multiplicities resolves what otherwise is a confusion in the concept of invariance. Implications of multiplicity of description for the security of quantum key distribution are noted.
Everybody agrees that quantum physics is strange, and that the world view it implies is elusive. However, it is rarely considered that the theory might be opaque because the mathematical language it employs is inarticulate. Perhaps, if a mathematical language were constructed specifically to handle the theory's subject matter, the theory itself would be clarified. This article explores that possibility. It presents a simple but rigorous language for the description of dynamics, experiments, and experimental probabilities. This language is then used to answer a compelling question: What is the set of allowed experiments? If an experiment is allowed, then the sum of the probabilities of its outcomes must equal 1. If probabilities are non-additive, there are necessarily sets of outcomes whose total probability is not equal to 1. Such experiments are therefore not allowed. That being the case, in quantum physics, which experiments are allowed, and why are the rest disallowed? What prevents scientists from performing the disallowed experiments? By phrasing these questions within our mathematical language, we will uncover answers that are complete, conceptually simple, and clearly correct. This entails no magic or sleight of hand. To write a rigorous mathematical language, all unnecessary assumptions must be shed. In this way, the thicket of ad hoc assumptions that surrounds quantum physics will be cleared. Further, in developing the theory, the logical consequences of the necessary assumptions will be laid bare. Therefore, when a question can be phrased in such a language, one can reasonably expect a clear, simple answer. In this way we will dispel much of the mystery surrounding quantum measurements, and begin to understand why quantum probabilities have their peculiar representation as products of Hilbert space projection operators.
When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
The basic equations of physics involve a time variable t and are invariant under the transformation t → −t. This invariance at first sight appears to impose time reversibility as a principle of physics, in conflict with thermodynamics. But equations written on the blackboard are not the whole story in physics. In prior work we sharpened a distinction obscured in today’s theoretical physics, the distinction between obtaining evidence from experiments on the laboratory bench and explaining that evidence in mathematical symbols on the blackboard. The sharp distinction rests on a proof within the mathematics of quantum theory that no amount of evidence, represented in quantum theory in terms of probabilities, can uniquely determine its explanation in terms of wave functions and linear operators. Building on the proof we show here a role in physics for unpredictable symbol-handling agents acting both at the blackboard and at the workbench, communicating back and forth by means of transmitted symbols. Because of their unpredictability, symbol-handling agents introduce a heretofore overlooked source of irreversibility into physics, even when the equations they write on the blackboard are invariant under t → −t. Widening the scope of descriptions admissible to physics to include the agents and the symbols that link theory to experiments opens up a new source of time-irreversibility in physics.
Quantum mechanics has several deficiencies as a complete theoretical description of the measurement process. Among them is the fact that the quantum mechanical description of correlations between the single measurements of a sequence is quite problematic. A single measurement is defined to be a preparation followed by an observation. In particular, one feels that an infinite sequence of such single measurements which corresponds to the measurement of a question O on a state η where η does not lie entirely in an eigenspace of O should generate a random output sequence. However, quantum mechanics seems to say nothing about this. In this paper, physical theories are defined in such a manner that correlations between single measurements are explicitly included. In particular, a physical theory is considered to be a mapping U, with domain in the set [Qsτ] of infinite instruction strings for carrying out infinite sequences of single measurements and range in the set of probability measures defined on A, the usual σ algebra of subsets of Ω. Ω is the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers. A fundamental property which any valid physical theory must satisfy is that it agrees with experiment. It is proposed and discussed here that much of the intuitive meaning of agreement between a theory U and experiment with respect to H is given by the statement ∀Qsτ [U(Qsτ) defined⇒E(H,U(Qsτ),ψQsτ)],where U(Qsτ) is the probability measure U associates with the infinite instruction string Qsτ and ψQsτ is the outcome sequence obtained by carrying out Qsτ. E(H, U(Qsτ),ψQsτ) is the statement that all formulas in H with one free sequence variable which are true on Ω almost everywhere with respect to U(Qsτ) are true for ψQsτ. H is a subclass of the class of all formulas in a formal language L. A theorem is proved which states that, if U(Qsτ) corresponds to a nontrivial product probability measure and U H-agrees with experiment, then the outcome sequence ψQsτ is H-random. H-randomness is defined here in terms of the statement E(H, P, φ). Another property of a valid physical theory, which is defined here, is that, for some Qsτ, U(Qsτ) must be determinable on much of AH from ψQsτ. Sufficient conditions for this property to hold are given. AH is the class of all H definable subsets of Ω. Some properties of the statement E(H, P, φ) are given. Among other things, it is proved that, if E(H, P, φ) holds and P is a nontrivial probability measure on A, then φ is not definable in H.
An argument by one of us is first reproduced, demonstrating that the bare negation of the consequences imposed by the completeness hypothesis, concerning the particular formal fact that a quantum-mechanical free wave packet can spread out indefinitely, leads necessarily to predictions on the presence probability distribution in interference states that diverge from the corresponding quantum-mechanical predictions. It follows that, contrary to what seemed to be almost generally accepted, it is erroneous to admit systematically that the completeness problems are essentially unconnected to observation. This result is similar to one previously established by Bell and seems to support a suggestion by Ballentine, that any hidden-variable theory might necessarily lead to predictive divergences from quantum mechanics, if internal "pathologies" are not admitted. The above-mentioned argument entails a first minimal definition of a nonorthodox significance of a state vector. In the continuation of this work this definition is tentatively developed in a constructive way. This development is realized by a modification of de Broglie's model of a microsystem. This modification, imposed by an examination of de Broglie's double-solution theory in the light of our conclusion demonstrated before, is in fact rather profound; in particular, it forces the abandonment of the central idea of two solutions with distinct physical meanings, of a unique evolution law. However, the theory called into consideration by this modification may be capable of leading to objective proofs of the specific descriptive power of the essence of de Broglie's conception on the structure of microsystems. Indeed, inside the general nonorthodox framework tentatively outlined, a detailed definition of the presence probability distribution is elaborated that coincides with the quantum-mechanical one outside interference states, but diverges from it in interference states, in an experimentally testable way. This is a verifiable constructive embodiment of the conclusion only critically obtained at the beginning of this work. A final verdict on the value of the specific basic conception of the outlined theory and of the new perspectives it brings forth can be obtained only by a further systematic theoretical elaboration and by the corresponding experimental tests.