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arXiv:0803.1473 · Physical Review A

Effect of detector dead times on the security evaluation of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution against sequential attacks

Marcos Curty, Kiyoshi Tamaki, Tobias Moroder

Published May 19, 2008• 24 citations
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Abstract

We investigate limitations imposed by detector dead times on the performance of sequential attacks against a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. In particular, we analyze sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination of the signal states emitted by the source and we obtain ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by a DPS QKD scheme both for the case of calibrated and uncalibrated devices, respectively.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.77.052321

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We investigate limitations imposed by detector dead times on the performance of sequential attacks against a differential-phase-shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. In particular, we analyze sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination of the signal states emitted by the source and we obtain ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by a DPS QKD scheme both for the case of calibrated and uncalibrated devices, respectively.
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In this paper we present limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the maximal distance achievable by a differential‐phase‐shift (DPS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with weak coherent pulses. Specifically, we compare the performance of two possible sequential attacks against DPS QKD where Eve realizes, respectively, optimal unambiguous state discrimination of Alice’s signal states, and optimal unambiguous discrimination of the relative phases between consecutive signal states. We show that the second eavesdropping strategy provides tighter upper bounds for the security of a DPS QKD scheme than the former one.
We investigate limitations imposed by sequential attacks on the performance of differential-phase-shift quantum key distribution protocols that use pulsed coherent light. In particular, we analyze two sequential attacks based on unambiguous state discrimination and minimum error discrimination, respectively, of the signal states emitted by the source. Sequential attacks represent a special type of intercept-resend attacks and, therefore, they provide ultimate upper bounds on the maximal distance achievable by quantum key distribution schemes.
In the well-established framework of quantum key distribution (QKD), differential phase shift (DPS) protocols have known information-theoretic security bounds defining tolerable error rates under optimal adversaries. In this work, we revisit the security of 3- and nnn -pulse DPS QKD by explicitly analyzing two specific, physically implementable individual attacks: minimum error discrimination (MED) and quantum cloning. Using semidefinite programming, we characterize these attacks in detail and quantify their induced quantum bit error rates (QBER) and resulting secure key rates under realistic system assumptions. The critical QBER thresholds for these attacks are approximately 20%, significantly higher than the theoretical lower bounds of 6% for individual and 4% for coherent attacks, indicating these are suboptimal adversarial strategies. This study primarily serves as a practical exercise to benchmark known attacks, providing explicit measures that aid experimental validation, protocol calibration, and risk assessment within current technological capabilities. Additionally, we explore finite-size effects and the effectiveness of phase randomization in weak coherent source-based protocols as protection against unambiguous state discrimination attacks.