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arXiv:0711.4770 · Physical Review A

Exponential complexity and ontological theories of quantum mechanics

A. Montina

Published Feb 11, 2008• 69 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Ontological theories of quantum mechanics describe a single system by means of well-defined classical variables and attribute the quantum uncertainties to our ignorance about the underlying reality represented by these variables. We consider the general class of ontological theories describing a quantum system by a set of variables with Markovian (either deterministic or stochastic) evolution. We provide proof that the number of continuous variables cannot be smaller than $2N\ensuremath{-}2$, $N$ being the Hilbert-space dimension. Thus, any ontological Markovian theory of quantum mechanics requires a number of variables which grows exponentially with the physical size. This result is relevant also in the framework of quantum Monte Carlo methods.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.77.022104

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Ontological theories of quantum mechanics describe a single system by means of well-defined classical variables and attribute the quantum uncertainties to our ignorance about the underlying reality represented by these variables. We consider the general class of ontological theories describing a quantum system by a set of variables with Markovian (either deterministic or stochastic) evolution. We provide proof that the number of continuous variables cannot be smaller than 2N\ensuremath−22N\ensuremath{-}22N\ensuremath−2, NNN being the Hilbert-space dimension. Thus, any ontological Markovian theory of quantum mechanics requires a number of variables which grows exponentially with the physical size. This result is relevant also in the framework of quantum Monte Carlo methods.
We study the possibility to describe pure quantum states and evens with classical probability distributions and conditional probabilities and show that the distributions and/or conditional probabilities have to assume negative values, except for a simple model whose realistic space dimension is not smaller than the Hilbert space dimension of the quantum system. This gives a negative answer to a question proposed by Montina [Phys.Rev.Lett.{\bf 97}, 180401 (2006)] whether or not does there exist a classical theory whose phase-space dimension is much smaller than the Hilbert space dimension for any quantum system. Thus, any realistic theory of quantum mechanics with nonnegative probability distributions and conditional probabilities requires a number of variables grows exponentially with the physical size.
Quantum theory describes our universe incredibly successfully. To our classically-inclined brains, however, it is a bizarre description that requires a reimagining of what fundamental reality, or “ontology”, could look like. This thesis examines different ontological features in light of the success of quantum theory, what it requires, and what it rules out. While these investigations are primarily foundational, they also have relevance to quantum information, quantum communication, and experiments on quantum systems. The way that quantum theory describes the state of a system is one of its most unintuitive features. It is natural, therefore, to ask whether a similarly strange description of states is required on an ontological level. This thesis proves that almost all quantum superposition states for d > 3 dimensions must be real—that is, present in the ontology in a well-defined sense. This is a strong requirement which prevents intuitive explanations of the many quantum phenomena which are based on superpositions. A new theorem is also presented showing that quantum theory is incompatible with macro-realist ontologies, where certain physical quantities must always have definite values. This improves on the Leggett-Garg argument, which also aims to prove incompatibility with macro-realism but contains loopholes. Variations on both of these results that are error-tolerant (and therefore amenable to experimentation) are presented, as well as numerous related theorems showing that the ontology of quantum states must be somewhat similar to the quantum states themselves in various specific ways. Extending these same methods to quantum communication, a simple proof is found showing that an exponential number of classical bits are required to communicate a linear number of qubits. That is, classical systems are exponentially bad at storing quantum data. Causal influences are another part of ontology where quantum theory demands a revision of our classical notions. This follows from the outcomes of Bell experiments, as rigorously shown in recent analyses. Here, the task of constructing a native quantum framework for reasoning about causal influences is tackled. This is done by first analysing the simple example of a common cause, from which a quantum version of Reichenbach’s principle is identified. This quantum principle relies on an identification of quantum conditional independence which can be defined in four ways, each naturally generalising a corresponding definition for classical conditional independence. Not only does this allow one to reason about common causes in a quantum experiments, but it can also be generalised to a full framework of quantum causal models (mirroring how classical causal models generalise Reichenbach’s principle). This new definition of quantum causal models is illustrated by examples and strengthened by it’s foundation on a robust quantum Reichenbach’s principle. An unusual, but surprisingly fruitful, setting for considering quantum ontology is found by considering time travel to the past. This provides a testbed for different ontological concepts in quantum theory and new ways to compare classical and quantum frameworks. It is especially useful for comparing computational properties. In particular, time travel introduces non-linearity to quantum theory, which brings (sometimes implicit) ontological assumptions to the fore while introducing strange new abilities. Here, a model for quantum time travel is presented which arguably has fewer objectionable features than previous attempts, while remaining similarly well-motivated. This model is discussed and compared with previous quantum models, as well as with the classical case. Together, these threads of investigation develop a better understanding of how quantum theory affects possible ontologies and how ontological prejudices influence quantum theory.
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle constitutes one of the foundational pillars of quantum mechanics and represents a definitive rupture with the deterministic ideal of classical physics. This work develops a comprehensive analysis of the uncertainty principle from a mathematical, physical, and philosophical perspective, demonstrating that it should not be interpreted as an instrumental or epistemological limitation, but rather as an ontological property inherent to the formalstructure of quantum theory.Within the framework of Hilbert spaces, self-adjoint operators, and non-commutative algebras, it is shown that uncertainty emerges necessarily as a consequence of the structural incompatibility between conjugate observables. The study articulates the uncertainty principle with classical chaos theory and the sciences of complexity, establishing a fundamental distinction between epistemological unpredictability and ontological indeterminacy. While classical chaos preserves well-defined trajectories that are practically inaccessible, quantum mechanics eliminates the very notion of trajectory as a fundamental entity.This rupture manifests itself in the granularity of phase space, the impossibility of defining exact initial conditions, and the consequent reformulation of determinism. Contemporary experimental developments designed to exclude instrumental disturbances are analyzed, reinforcing the ontological interpretation of the uncertainty principle.Finally, the implications for simulation, predictability, and quantumOverall, this work argues that the uncertainty principle does not undermine scientific rationality, but rather redefines itsscope and deepens our understanding of physical reality. Keywords: uncertainty principle; quantum mechanics; mathematical structure; non-commutative operators; chaos theory; complexity; determinism; physical ontology.
It is a scientific truism nowadays that quantum mechanical predictions are of statistical or rather of probabilistic nature: a quantum theory assigns a probability distribution to each measurable quantity (observable) of a physical system prepared according to a given preparation prescription (state). Such sets of probability distributions represent the most general quantitative predictions of physical theories. The aim of this study is to determine all theoretical frameworks which yield such a kind of output taking the probabilistic nature of quantitative physical predictions as initial hypothesis. Astonishingly, this project succeeds with a minimal number of additional assumptions, which arise quite naturally in the course of the analysis, and which essentially amount to regularity conditions. The result is that there exist only two classes of physical theories providing quantitative probabilistic predictions: classical theories where observables are represented by real functions over a phase space and states are represented by probability measures upon the phase space, and quantum theories where observables are represented by selfadjoint operators acting on a complex Hilbert space and states are represented by state operators. On empirical grounds, classical theories cannot provide the all-encompassing, fundamental frame for the mathematical description of physical systems. Quantum theories remain, and there is no more complete formal frame for quantitative physical theories. As an additional result, it is shown that there exist physical systems which possess a quantum mechanical but no classical description; a prominent example is the spin system of two spin-1/2 particles. The classical hidden variables model, which J. Bell relates to this system in order to prove his theorem, cannot be a true description of it because no such classical model exists, and Bell's theorem loses its foundation.
The properties which give quantum mechanics its unique character - unitarity, complementarity, non-commutativity, uncertainty, nonlocality - derive from the algebraic structure of Hermitian operators acting on the wavefunction in complex Hilbert space. Because of this, the wavefunction cannot be shown to describe an ensemble of deterministic states where uncertainty simply reflects a lack of knowledge about which ensemble member describes reality. This has led to endless debates about the ontology of quantum mechanics. Here we derive these same quantum properties from number theoretic attributes of trigonometric functions applied to an explicitly ensemble-based representation of discretised complex Hilbert states. To avoid fine-tuning, the metric on state space must be ppp-adic rather than Euclidean where 1/p1/p1/p determines the fineness of the discretisation. This hints at both the existence of an underpinning fractal state-space geometry onto which states of the world are constrained. In this model, violation of Bell inequalities is a manifestation of this geometric constraint and does not imply a breakdown of local space-time causality. Because the discretised wavefunction describes an ensemble of states, there is no collapse of the wavefunction. Instead measurement describes a nonlinear clustering of state-space trajectories on the state-space geometry. In this model, systems with mass greater than the Planck mass will not exhibit quantum properties and instead behave classically. The geometric constraint suggests that the exponential increase in the size of state space with qubit number may break down with qubit numbers as small as a few hundred. Quantum mechanics is itself a singular limit of this number-theoretic model at p=∞p=\inftyp=∞. A modification of general relativity, consistent with this discretised model of quantum physics, is proposed.
Formulations of quantum mechanics (QM) can be characterized as realistic, operationalist, or a combination of the two. In this paper a realistic theory is defined as describing a closed system entirely by means of entities and concepts pertaining to the system. An operationalist theory, on the other hand, requires in addition entities external to the system. A realistic formulation comprises an ontology, the set of (mathematical) entities that describe the system, and assertions, the set of correct statements (predictions) the theory makes about the objects in the ontology. Classical mechanics is the prime example of a realistic physical theory. A straightforward generalization of classical mechanics to QM is hampered by the inconsistency of quantum properties with classical logic, a circumstance that was noted many years ago by Birkhoff and von Neumann. The present realistic formulation of the histories approach originally introduced by Griffiths, which we call 'compatible quantum theory (CQT)', consists of a 'microscopic' part (MIQM), which applies to a closed quantum system of any size, and a 'macroscopic' part (MAQM), which requires the participation of a large (ideally, an infinite) system. The first (MIQM) can be fully formulated based solely on the assumption of a Hilbert space ontology and the noncontextuality of probability values, relying in an essential way on Gleason's theorem and on an application to dynamics due in large part to Nistico. Thus, the present formulation, in contrast to earlier ones, derives the Born probability formulas and the consistency (decoherence) conditions for frameworks. The microscopic theory does not, however, possess a unique corpus of assertions, but rather a multiplicity of contextual truths ('c-truths'), each one associated with a different framework. This circumstance leads us to consider the microscopic theory to be physically indeterminate and therefore incomplete, though logically coherent. The completion of the theory requires a macroscopic mechanism for selecting a physical framework, which is part of the macroscopic theory (MAQM). The selection of a physical framework involves the breaking of the microscopic 'framework symmetry', which can proceed either phenomenologically as in the standard quantum measurement theory, or more fundamentally by considering the quantum system under study to be a subsystem of a macroscopic quantum system. The decoherent histories formulation of Gell-Mann and Hartle, as well as that of Omnès, are theories of this fundamental type, where the physical framework is selected by a coarse-graining procedure in which the physical phenomenon of decoherence plays an essential role. Various well-known interpretations of QM are described from the perspective of CQT. Detailed definitions and proofs are presented in the appendices.