Abstract This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a (Wittgensteinian) philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics (like Bohmian mechanics or ’t Hooft’s Cellular Automaton interpretation) are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low (or even zero) probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements (and of the safety of quantum cryptography) should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In three appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, review the notion of 1-randomness (or algorithmic randomness) that in various guises was investigated by Kolmogorov and others and treat Bell’s (Physics 1:195–200, 1964) Theorem and the Free Will Theorem with their implications for randomness.
A number of books have appeared purporting to explain quantum mechanics to the general public. These books have put considerable emphasis on so-called quantum 'paradoxes', using them to portray the quantum theory as mysterious or 'spooky'. The author discusses these 'paradoxes' from a different viewpoint with the aim of demystifying the theory. Emphasis is shifted from an epistemological viewpoint (as exemplified by the 'probability interpretation') to an ontological one (the description of matter by physical fields). Difficulties in reconciling the probability interpretation with relativity are noted, and the importance of phase coherence, which is inadequately treated in the probability interpretation, is emphasised. In the light of such as approach, the 'paradoxes' are resolved.
The preparation procedure, an undefined notion in quantum theory, has not had the relevance that it deserves in the interpretation of quantum mechanical formalism.Here we utilize the concepts of identical and similar preparation procedures to show the conceptual differences between the statistical and the conventional interpretation of quantum formalism.Although the statistical understanding, and its final logical consequence, hidden variables theories (this connexion being explained in the text), have a great intuitive appeal due to its fewer ontological difficulties, both recent experimental results and theoretical developments seem to support an epistemic alternative closer to the conventional one.Nevertheless, we must not rule out the possibility that new theorems or new explanatory principles may modify the reigning supremacy of this interpretation. 1.-Introduction.Although the conventional interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism (CIQM), very close to the Copenhagen interpretation, is still dominant (is used in almost all textbooks), there are physical situations that ask for an interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism (QMF) in terms of the Statistical Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (SIQM) or even for hidden variables theories (HVT).The SIQM and HVT are different research programs, but they are closely related, as we will see further below.To introduce properly the distinctions between the three previous acronyms we will ask an old and apparently simple question.Is the wave function associated to an individual system or to a statistical ensemble?A first tentative answer could be formulated as follows.QMF introduces probabilities, and probabilities are related to statistical ensembles.Otherwise, the same concept of probability would lose its meaning.In QM, if it is said that you would get some concrete result with 0,63 probability it means that if the experiment is carried out 100 times, that concrete result would appear approximately 63 times.Hence, the obvious answer will be that the wave function should be related with statistical ensembles.However, despite its intuitiveness this idea does not capture completely what we want to express.The real problem to analyze could be best introduced with the following example.Imagine that we prepare identically two radioactive atoms with half-life of 30 minutes.By preparation we understand all those theoretical methods and physical procedures necessary to fully characterize the state of the system.It is, thus, a macroscopic reproducible act that lefts the system, without destroying it, in a concrete state after the procedure.In quantum theory, this preparation is represented by a vector state (or a density matrix).Identically in this context will mean identity of procedures, that is that the experimenter has repeated all previous operations, so that there is no difference whatsoever between them.Note, however, that identical preparations are not necessarily followed by identical results, so there is
In two previous papers a causal interpretation of the quantum theory was developed which involved the hypothesis that a quantum-mechanical system contains a precisely defined particle variable x but that, at present, we are restricted to calculating the probability density
P(x,t) that the particle is at the position x. It was shown that the assumption that $P(\mathrm{x}, t)={|\ensuremath{\psi}(\mathrm{x}, t)|}^{2}$ is consistent, in the sense that if it holds initially, the equations of motion of the particles will cause this relation to be maintained for all time. In this paper, we extend the theory by showing that as a result of random collisions, an arbitrary probability density will ultimately decay into one with a density of ${|\ensuremath{\psi}(\mathrm{x}, t)|}^{2}$. Since all quantum-mechanical experiments to date have been concerned with statistical ensembles of systems that have been colliding with other systems for a very long time, it is therefore inevitable that as we draw samples from such ensembles, the probability density of systems with particles at the point x will be equal to ${|\ensuremath{\psi}(\mathrm{x}, t)|}^{2}$.In the previous papers we also pointed out that, within the conceptual framework of the causal interpretation, it was possible to suggest mathematical theories more general than are permitted by the usual interpretation and that these more general theories might be needed in the domain of ${10}^{\ensuremath{-}13}$ cm, where present theories seem to fail. However, if these more general theories should apply at the level of ${10}^{\ensuremath{-}13}$ cm, then there would be a tendency to create discrepancies between
P and ${|\ensuremath{\psi}|}^{2}$, a tendency whose cumulative effects should be felt even at the atomic level, where the more general theory ought to approach the usual theory. However, because those discrepancies have been shown to die out as a result of collisions, we can expect that under normal conditions the difference between
P and ${|\ensuremath{\psi}|}^{2}$ would be negligible. Conditions are suggested, however, in which this difference might be appreciable, and experiments are indicated which might be able to test for the existence of such discrepancies.